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ABSTRACT 
Maritime operalJO;'1S in a httord! area demand a fundamental change in [he future 
deftnse build-up of the Jilp~ncsc Maritime Self Defense Force {JMSDPj. The ami-air 
"'arfare (AA 'N) capability of the JMSDF in the littoral area, especiall y against very low 
al ti tude anti-ship cruise missi les (ASCMs), should be improved. To achieve the requi red 
future air defense lethality, the JMSDF must optimize the resource allocation within a 
limited budget. Therefore, it is im[XJrlant to understand the essential elements of air defense 
Ic!h<llity by the JMSDF Aegis destroyer in order to improve their operdtional effectiveness. 
In this study, a measure of effectiveness (II/jOE) for Aegis lethality against an ASCM atl'lck 
is defined as "a denial area at an acceptable risk." Using this MOE, spread sheet lethali ty 
moods based on Aegis weapons characteristics, target detection range, reaction time, and 
ASCM speed, are developed <md used to study several alternative improvements to AegiS 

THESIS DISCLAIMER 
The viev.'s expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official poJicyor (XlSi lioll of the Japancsc Defense Agency or the Japanese Government 
The reader IS cautioned that computer programs developed in this thesis may not 
have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, withm the 
time available, to ensure that the programs are free of COmpUl2.tion errors, they cannot be 
consldered validated. Any application of these programs without addit ional venfication is at 
the Iisk of the user 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. CHANGE OF TIlE WORLD ORl>ER - LITTORAL AREA OP E RATION 
Since the break up of the Soviet Uni on, there is a decreased chance of a connie! 
between the U,S. amI the Soviet Union which could imp.,ct Japan. It is more likely that a 
conflict would arise with a third world counlry and would involve li lloml areas. The end of 
the Cold War has caused changes in the tactical environment. It is expressed best by the 
change in naval strategies from "open ocean orx:rations" to "littoral afea operations" . From 
the Sea states: 
Tbe li ttoral region is frequently characterized by confined 
water and air spact: occupied by friends , adversaries , ~nd 
ident ification profoundl y difficult. This environment poses 




This indicates clearl y that Japan needs to hand le a more complex and uncertain runle 
space. It demands a fundamental change in future defense bm ld. ups of the Japane.s~ 
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) to meet the demands in a httoral area of operations 
1. Expected Mission of Japancsc Fleet 
Since Japan is a heavily sea·dependent country. there is no doubt that keeping the 
!>ea lanes of communication (SLOC) open for commercial mari time passage is a "lifeline" of 
Japan. Although the validity of SLOC protection is unchanging. the expected mission to 
achieve it is changing. Thc complex si tuation in the Asia·Pacific regIOn, especially the 
fmure uncertainty of North KOr<'~i and China, and tenitorial d isputes over the Spratly and 
Para.cellslands in the South China Sea, pose a more potential threat to Japan's SLOe than 
attacks from the C1!:.Soviet submanne neets. Furthennore, as U.S. Department of 
Dcfense's Officcof IntemationaJ Security Affairs points out: 
Japan's new global mle involves greater Japanese contribution to regional and 
global stability. Japan is the world's largest Official. Development Assistance 
prov,d<T and has lDcrclIs~d ,ts lDvolvemellt 10 humaJlltanll ll <Iud peacekeeping 
efforts around the globe, [Ref. 2: p. 10 1 
Therefore. Japan shou ld anticipate playing a significant role ill. stabilizing the world 
security environment. T his Imp li~ that tne utilization of JMSDF assets for a wide range of 
missions, rather than the inherent SLOC protection, could be a realistic scenario in the near 
future. The Advisory Group on Defense Issues reportt:d to the Japanese Pri me Mlllister in 
1993: 
We believe importan(;e should bt: atta(;hed particularly to the capahility 01 
dealing with the following situations: interfere,nce in the s,afety of maritime 
traffic, vlolallon of temtonal air space. hmlled missile atta(;k. Illegal 
occupation of a part of the country. terronst acts. and Inflnx of armed 
refugees. [Ref. 3: p. 18) 
It suggests that the lMSDF should seek 10 have multi-mission capabili ties. 
2. Nccessity of AAW Capability Improvements for JMSDF 
During the Cold War. the lMSDF focused on defending SLOC against Soviet 
submarine attack. It made lMSDF fOlce structure slanted toward Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW). With the changing tacticalenvirorunent for super powcrs as well as Japan, scycrdi 
studies and articlcsdcyoted to thc role of Japan and J~vISDF in the last few years fCfXJr<ed 
that: 
Shortfalls in the Japanese defensive arsenal continue to exist in sea lane 
defense - _including ~irboTl1e carly warning and ship-borne, <Inti-air capab! lity 
OefiCleDcles also eXIst In land based an. hip-borne anti-missile capablhty 
[Ref. 2: p_ 26] 
concluding 
efforts should be madc to build up a more balanced maritime defense 
capahility_ For _example. the snrveiHa?~c and patrol functions <IS well as anti-
snrface and antl-ancraft hattIe capabdlllCS should be further Improved.lRef. 3 
p. 22] 
It is dear from these extracts that the JMSDF must concenlTate on improving the anti-air 
warfare (AA W) capability to participate variety of fUnlfC operations. 
3, NeceSSity of COEA App.oach fo. JMSDF 
In the Post-Cold War era, "It is hardly likely that fiscal conditions surroundmg 
defense bui ldup will improve in the long tenn," [Ref. 3: p. J9] Actually, Japanese Defense 
Agency 's (.lOA's) wcapons procurcmenthas fallen steadily from $12.33 billion in fiscal 
1990 to the present $9.48 billion [Ref. 4: p. 23]. Therefore, the JMSOF must be cost-
effective. To achieve the future defense demands, it must optimize the resource allocation 
with a limited defense budget in order 10 maintain and improve current defense capabilit: 
As an cJ\.amp!c of the nced for optimi:t.ing reSQurce aJICX'.a.tioo, consider the next 
generation support fighter called FS-X. It is doubtful whether thiS fi ghter is cost-effective 
As stated by A viatwn Weeks and Space Technology: 
The JDA's 1996 budget request marks unit prices fOf FS-X at $ 126_8 million. 
induding $14.4 miHion for spares With a full production run, the .lOA 
still a th ird morc than 
Compalt:d to other aJrcraft unit prices, for example, the F-\4D at $88. I million, F-15E 
$43 .7 miillon, F/A - l!)EJF at $83.2 million , [Ref. 61 MIG-29 at $27 million [Ref. 7 : p_ 26J , 
and the Su-32FN at $3G million [Ref. 7: p. 25] , the FS-X looks too expensive. Even 
though thi~ cost should be seen as a so-called opportunity cost rather than just aircraft 
price. l( is stili open to question whether a sufficient study of the cost effectiveness of the 
FS-X had been done in the early stage of this program 
A Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) is a fundamental task of 
weapon system acq\lls ition III the US According 10 DoD Instruction 5000.2, one of (he 
irrtentions of COEA is to 
The CO::',\ is one of the essential elements of the U.S. DoD decision making process for 
all acquisition programs, especiall y under a shrinking hudgeL Improving the current 
weapon acquisiTion system by usi ng the COEA iJ.pproach is vital to the Japilllese Defense 
Agency. 
B, PU RPOSE 
This thesis will develop a recommendation, based on a COEA approach, for sea-
based anti-ai r deft:r1sc (AD) sys tcms_ It will focus on improving th~ Jl'vlSDF fleet AA W or 
AD capabilIty. It willllse a COEA logic basis to develop and identify the essential elements 
and events III an AD scenario to provide the prerequisi tes of a JMSDF J-lcet .M\\' 
capahility improvement program. It could be said that it is a kind of Essential Elements 
Analysis (EEA)_ b te rms 01 COEA, DoD /l1stru.cliolls 5000.2 says that 
Although the highli ght of COE-A is ' ·cost-effectiveness comparisons", this thesis will limit 
the dISCUSSIon to the operatIonal e ffeCllveness known as mi li tary lllilily , since reasonable 
cost da ta IS not available. In short, the goals of th is thesis can be summarized as fo llows: 
J) Definean measure of effcrt jveness (MOE) for AA \Voperations. 
2) l!Iustrate spread sheet models measuring the JMSDF Aegis destroyer AA W 
operational effectiveness. 
3) Identify current JMSDF system deficiencies and essential factors. 
4) Propose some dcsirableAA W assets options for JMSDF. 
C. FRAMEWORK OF RESEARCH 
This thesis has been organized into four areas (Chapters Il through V) 
Chapter II analYLes the expected mission of the JMSDF subjectively and represents 
it by characterized parameters. It then surveys the CllfTent and near fu ture predicted threats 
and AA W improvement programs. 
Chapter III develops spread sheet models to measure operational effectiveness of 
the characterized mission discussed in Chapter II. Two models arc presented: The expected 
value model and a Monte Carlo simulation. 
Chapter IV shows exampk result~ from these models. It examines the current 
system deficiencies and proposes methods for satisfying the JMSDF requirements and 
alleviating deficiencies. 
Chapter V F escnts the recommended development of new AA W a%ets based on 
the analyses in Chapter l llhrough Chapter 1 V. 
Chapter VI summarizes conclusions and present~ remaini ng problems 
Il. MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS 
A. THE MISSION ENVIRO"'lMENT FOR THE JMSDF AEGIS 
The expected missions of the Japanese !leet are expanding. Reflection on some of 
these missions reveals the possibility that support from the Japlmese Air Defense Force 
(JASOn could be low. Tn the past, JASDF assets, such as the F-15, FS-X, E-2C. and 
A \V ACS were procured and deployed on the assumption th..'I1 their requin.'d mission 
::apahilitieswere to prevent the invasion of Japanese territory. These aircrdlt are all 1and-
based. Their mission range and endurance, with the exception orlhe Airoorne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircmft, are designed for territorial operation. Unfortunately, 
A \VACS is not ilexjble because only a high intensity situation would pennit its use beyond 
Japan's territorial boundaries. Although we should not ignore: the U.S. Pacifi.;; Acet and 
thc Japan-US Security Treaty, we cannot assume that the JlvfSDF will always be 
supported hy U.S. Forces. It is certainly the most de~1J-ahle situation, hut \-ve should not ~ 
toc' optiIllIsrrc 
Furthermore, as \:lashiko rRef. 91 fOinted out, the two most like.ly crisis scenarios 
to (lGCur Mound Japan in the early 21st century are "the repercllssion from othe:r regional 
conflicts" and "'the participation in peace-keeping operations (PKOs),'. Both of these 
scenarios belong to the category of a low-intensity conJ1ict (Lie). In this type of conflict. 
"the use of military force is highly focusoo and restrained, often relying more on police, 
propaganda, imelligence, lUlU military support elements than on miliwry combat units." 
lRef. 10: p. 165J This implies that limited milit-uy assets, like surface action groups 
(SAGs), maritime action groups (MAGs), or less capable force groups, could be proJccted 
in the beginning of a conflict. However these conflicts could escalate rapidly, or a sudden 
attack may happen, even though the conflicts seems under control. The higgest concern 
would be the proliferation of sophisticatoo weapons, especially anti-ship cruisc missiles 
(i\SCMs). 
Another mission which has be;,:ome important is Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
(TRMD). A<:'-cording 10 Jane 's Dejence 'H-'eekly [Ref. 11: p. 21J, the U.S. Ballistic Mssile 
Defense Organization (RMDO) briefed Japanese officials on the four basie defense options 
for early in the next de.::ade to counter the perceived threat of a l\"orth Korean balhstie 
miSSile attack on the JapmIese home islands. Their options are summaril.Cd below: 
1) Four existing and currently planned Aegis destroyers for upper tier defense, and 
twenty four Patriot PAC-2 batteries, which will become opc,dtional in ]999 
and upgrddcd to PAC-3 standards for lower tier defense . This would only 
ac.count for an attack by the Nonh Korean Nodong-l intcnncdiatc range 
system, and it would divert Aegis from protecting the SLOe. This option 
would cost $4.5 billion. 
2) An additional eight Aegis destroyers, wilh the Patriot batteries the same as in 
option I , and a new surveillance radar system that would be located west of 
Tokyo, This is the most flexible option, but the cost would be $16.3 billion. 
3) Six land-based Theater High Alti tLKlt' Air Defense (THAAD) systems, and the 
twenty four upgraJed Patriot PAC-3 batteries. The missile inventory would be 
560 missiles. This option would cost $4.55 billion 
4) Four Aegis ships, twenty fou r PAC-3 Patriot baTIeries, and six THAAD 
systems. This option would cost $8.9 billion. 
In \elms of the Aegis destroyers, these options are based on the assumption of a ne\\ 
theater missile defense system and 36 anti-theater ballistic missiles. In short, it cOlJd be 
said that this improvement expands the Aegis high altitude threat handling c.1pability. 
However, it does not appear that the new system would improve our Aegis low altitude 
thrrcat handling capability. 
Is a ballistic missile attack really likely to occur? W. Seth Carns [Ref. 12: p. 31 ] 
provides some thoughts on this subje<:t: 
The Persian Gulf war is certain to affect tbe attitudes of Tbird World COU1]trjes 
coneem ing the relative value of ballistic missiles as compareJ with cruise 
missiles. Military experts in the Tbird World w<;:re acutely aware of tbe 
dramatic contrast between the inaccllracy of the Iraq i AI-Husayn ballistic 
missiles and performance of tbe U.S. tomahawk missiles 
Therefore, this thesis will focus on the low al titude threat whieh seems to have received 
less attention in Japan than TB!vID. However, It is still important to keep TBMD aspects in 
mind as we examine any AA W improvements. Even if we examine the low al ti tude threat, 
the contribution to TBMD, or the expansion of the high al titude mission, should be gil'en 
consideration. 
B_ PRIMARY F UNCTIONS OF JMSDF AEG IS 
T here arc a varie ty of missions for Aegis. Usually, own-ship survivability is a 
common evaluation value in terms of AD at sea. Seeking own-ship survival during a gi\'en 
miSSIOn IS one of the most important aspects, since it i~ and has been a prerequisite fOI 
al:hieving any of the missIOns, except the KidvllKAZEallacks in WWIl. However, it is not 
enough since it does not guamntee the success of any mission. In olber words, own-ship 
survivahiliry is a IIcccs<;ary condition, but not a sufficient condition by itself for mission 
succe;;;;. Relevant to this point is Ball's lRef 13J following summary of tbc prilmlry air 
defense mis~10n8 
1) thc protection of high value as;;ets 
2) the protection of maneuver fort.:c5 
3) the selective disruption or d~st11lction of specific aircraft 
""'hat is immcdiatclyapparent in this extract is thallhe main oI:;,;ectivr of all AD unit is not to 
survive itself, but to providc or secure air space against hostile air activity. From this view 
point, the principal function of Aegis is obviously to defend a space a~ large n possible 
The current primary air tllrcaI to the JklSDF is an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCMs) 
1'11(: next s~ctiO\l will examine this threat 
C. PREDICTED THREAT ~ ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE (ASCM) 
This lhesi~ will focus on th~ very low altitude incoming ASCM, or so-called sea-
skimm~r, since it is oneof the most diffieultt:ugets which 1Ne could fac.:e. For the momem, 
Il is useful to examine the features of CUlTent low-flying ASCMs. 
Characteristic data of major ASO.1s are listed in Appendix A. The general features 
of eurreili low-flying ASCMs are subsonic (\:fach 0.8 ~ 0.93), active ladar horning, and 
less than 100 NM maximum range (most are less Ihan 50 NM). II is nOl~d lhalthc Soviet 
and Soviet-derived ASCM~ whic11 have been the primary threal during the Cold War, are 
unlikely to be sea-skimmers except for the SS-N-2S "Harpoonski" and the P-270 
"Mockit"- It could be said thallypicaJ sea-skimming ASCMs belong to the Exoc~t family 
since their abililies= ranked high and th~y ar~ widely used. The most advanced version is 
tne Exccet Block ll. It is still a subsonic missile, but a company manager said in Aviation 
Week & Space Technology that 
application of digital tech nology permits an optimized sea-skimming flight 
profile through calculations 01 the lowest possible altitude based on the actual 
sea state condition. The mock II weapon is abk to fly at altitudes of only 
several meters above the water. [Ref. 15: p. 66) 
According to World Naval Weapon Systems [Ref. 16J, the Exocet Block ll' s capabilities 
are further explained 
The missile can corkscrew to evade terminal defenses. It can also dogleg. 
changing direction by up to 90 deg. II can fly a self-adapting sea-sk imming 
profi le in sea states up to 7. and it has better ECCM. The range, about 70 km, 
is not alfectcd. The missile can select targets (i.e .. it has some form of ta rget 
identifier on board) A new FCS. rrUITS 70. allows multiple targets to be 
engaged. fires salvos against more than one t.1rge\ anu converging salvo on 
one target. [Ref. 17: p. 21) 
These extracts imply that if an AD system fails to shoot the Exocctdown within the missile 
defense zone, it is almost impossible to achieve a "hard kill". Future ASCM improvements 
could be demonstrated by the Anti Naeires Supersonique (ANS), which is intended to 
reach supersonic speed (Mach 2.0) [Ref. 16: p. 1741 . Its range will be 55 NM in 10-10-10 
profile, or 110- 137 NM in lo-hi-lo or hi-hi-Io profile. The maneuverability limit is 15G 
(compared to 6G for Exocet).[Ref. 17: p. 21] 
P-270 Moskit is another illustration of a supersonic sea-skimmer. It may fly at 
Mach 3.5, 23 fcetabove sea level, use an imaging microwave radar seeker, and be highly 
resistant to all but the most sophisticated countermeasures [Ref. 18: p. 47], Journal of 
Electronic Defense [Ref. 19: p. 181 reIX)(ted a jXlSsible transfer of Moskit missile 
technology to the People's Republic of China. 
Friedman's comments on such a supersonic sea-skimmer include· 
The attraction of supersonic flight is tba t it drastically shortens time available 
to the defense. Morec)\"er, even if a missile is hit, its fragments will continue 
towards the target The faster the missile, the more momentum in the 
fragments and the greater tbe.minimum acceptable destruction range. On t~e 
other hand, It IS probably qUI te dIffIcult to make a sea-sklmmlllg supersoDlc 
missile. because the momentum ,viII also reduce its ability to pikh up in time 
to miss oncoming waves. The missile itself may be quite bot (from 
aerodynamic beating) and thus it may be more susceptible to early IR 
detection. [Ref. 20: p. 43] 
These ASCMs shrink the reaction time by not only hiding themselves by the curvature of 
the earth but also pushing out the inside mi~mum cffective intercept zone. A commonly 
aco: pted rule of thumb is that the rJanger zone represented by the effect of shot-down 
ml~sile wreckage is about I km per Mach number of missile speed [Ref. 18: p. 47J_ The 
available time and room for error left to shipboard decision makers is small. Figurc I helps 
us get a sense of the avmlablt time from initial ASCM detection to the launching of a 
surface-to- air missile (S!\t\1)_ Suppose a SAM must intercept an ASC:v1 at 5 N:-"1 from the 
launching ship witl1 an average S!\M horizontal speed of Ma(;h 2.0. An initial detection 
r.mge i~ radar hO/lzorl, Rh, which is given by: [Ref. 21: p. 2'1.1J 
Rh_L23·(~+~) (NM) (2. 1) 
where hRAuARis a radar height (feef) and hASC"rAis an incoming ASCM flight altitude (reet) . 
The Aegis radar height of 55 feet, and the cmise altitude of an incoming ASCM, ,vith the 
,\SCM coming straight in with a constant spced are also assumed. 
For example, jf an ,\SC/I.·l i~ approaching at a 100 foot altitude al l\1ach 0_9, about 
90 seconds are available for launching a S1\:'v1. If an ASCM is f1ying lower, ~ay 40 feel, the 
reaction time goes down to ai:::out 60 seconds. FUrtheI more, if it nies super~onic, Mach 
2.0, less than 20 seconds arc available. In the case of Mach 3.5, only 5 seconds arc left To 
make matters worse, when a friendly surface unit (FSU) is stationed at 10 NM from Aegis, 
a SAM launched from Aegis should intercept an ASC:-..1 at more than 10 NM away. The 
available reaction time against Mach 0.9 ASCM is at most 14 seconds. If thc speed of an 
ASCMexceeds l"vfach lA, no timc is available for Aegis. However, these are, in a sense, 
optimistic estimations since it is doubtful that a detection will be made at the radar hunzon. 
The biggest trend in ASCM improvements is to reduce observability: 
One avenue being pursued is to enhance the "stealth" characteristics of the 
missile. This could he achieved hy optimi)':ed airframe shaping and the 
incorporation of radar absorbent material (RAM) in the skin to reduce the 
missile's radar cross section (RCS) .. In addition, advanced propulsion, such 
as pwpfans, has been studied as a means of reducing the weapon's infru-red 
signature. [Ref. 22: p. 1S4] 
The simple form of the radar equation that expresses the maximum radar range, Rmax, is 
given by: [Ref. 23: p. 151 
(2.2) 
where PI is the transmitted power (watts), G is antenna gain, Ae is antenna effective 
aperture (ml), Smin is minimwn detectable signal (watts), and 0 is radar cross section 
(RCS) (m"). If a given radar is specified, all parameters except RCS are constant in this 
equation. The maximum detection range varies with the founh root of RCS. If thc RCS is 
reduced by a factor of 10, then Rmax is shortenf" by a factor to 0.56. In other words 
S\ll-lpose Aegis can detect a target, which has 1m ' .{CS, at 100 NM range Ir the ReS of 
the target goes down to 0, 1m2, the possible detection range of Aegis should be shortened to 
56NM 
The above discussion implies that the earliest warning the ship may reccive IS the 
radar seeker emission of the ASCM rather than the radar detection. However, although 
acti vc radar seekers arc the most common tenninaJ guidance device, IR seekers and thennal 
imaging are in service, and dual-mode seekers that incorporate both active radar and 
passive IR advantages are emerging technology. This deprives AD systems of early alert by 
E!ectrorncSupport Measures (ESMJ. Beside~, 
Such seekers have tbe advantage of heing effective in a crowded environment 
and, if coupled with feed·back data link, could allow tho: selection of the 
desired target or the most appropriate aim-point. IReI' 22: p. 154] 
With highly complcxevasive maneuvers. low oooervability, and a limited amount of time, 
it is clear that it is difficult to kill sea-skimming ASCMs. As applied to the Jinora! area 
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The threat of a sudden attack from an "unkJJown' target in littoral area operations i~ of more 
concern due to a greater variety of delivery platforms and tmreliable IFF capabilities. 
Probably the most difficult problem for ship commanders is the wnfirmation of the 
Intention of an "unknown" contact 
D. AAW IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS 
It is useful to survey the trend of the sea-based AA W Improvement programs to 
understand the general ideas and aVilllable technology. Probably the best program for trend 
analysis for JMSD F Aegis destroyers is the USN DDG-51 Right 1IA 'upgmie program, 
since ~OG-51 Arlcigh Burke IS the base mOOel ship of JMSDF Aegis destroyers. This 
program incorporates littor"l area opcrati on~. Based 0(1 jane's Fighting Ship 1995-1996 
[Rd. 26J and U.S. Insti/we Proceedillgslluly 1994 [Ref. 141, the scheduled modifications 
of the ~OG-51 in terms of AAWare summariZeilln Table 1 
Addmg Systems Deleting Systems 
'" Six more VLS cells (32 forward, 64 att.) '" Harpoon 
" Evolved Sea Sparrow ClWS " Pharanx CIWS 
~ Dual hangar, Two SH-60s (aftf~r ESSM addition) 
~ Tactical Data lnfonllation Link (T AD1LJ) 
* Raising the positio(1 of aft SPY I-D arrays 
I"able 1. ~OG-51 Hight llA Upgrade 
II 
From this upgradc program, three trends become clear. Fi rst, a short range missile 
is used as a point defense hard kill weapon instead of guns such as the Phalam and the 
Goalkeeper. This must be based on the doubt about the effectiveness of current close-in 
weapon systems (ClWS) against ASCMs with high speed and maneuverability. 
Reportc(Uy the E~ocet tests convinced the Frcnch navy t h ~t close-in gun 
systems were futile. The British reached similar conclusions based on the 
e~pectation tbat future anti-ship missiles .... ould be hypersonic.[Rd 17- p. 
132] 
A couple of short range SAM improvemenL" such as Rolling Airframe_ Missile (RAM Ot 
RlM-1l6A),Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM or RIM-7R), and ASTER exist These 
support a trend away from Phalanx and Goalkeeper. These three missiles' features are 
summarized in Table. 2 based on reference [16] and [171 
ESSM 
.. Range 




semi active midcourse. 
IR terminal, and anti-
radar homing 
RAM 
(US., German, Danish) 
"Potential Target 
Activehoming missiles 
(RAM II can use IR seeker 







Passive RF midcourse, lR 
tenninal 





(Mach 2.5, IS-Gs) 
Anti -radar missile 
Fighter aircraft 
~Range 
10 km : supersonic target 
15-17 km: subsonic 
"Reaction Time 
15-20 sec. 
5sec.(using Arabel radar) 
Another approach for improving the point defense ca~bility for ships is using "soft 
kill" weaJX)ns. These options include active off-ooard decoys or off-board c\pendable 
jammcn; such as Nulka. The Nulka was intended to overcome the weakness of Jammers 
against anti-radar or home-on-jam type missiles. 
Jammer<; present the same h~zards in operation as do the radar systems tbe~ 
counter - their emission can be detected by passive means from ranges 
~onsidn~bly greater than the effective range of the system In questi~ll_ JUS! as 
a ship ... ~,r,g Its radar reveals its poslhon, so does any ship mltlatmg actl\ e 
jamlTIil"~' "rocedurec. This is vulnerable to exploitation by anti -radar missiles 
(ARM) "sed in the hQlTIe-on-jam mode. lRcf. 27: p_ 42] 
12 
\Vhen the Nulka system is launched, a hovering rocket called Winnin carries an actlvc: 
jammer to suppress the threaL It looks like Chaff, but there <lIe no Chaff-like deficiencies. 
That IS' 
The features of Nulka arc summarized below: 
is affected by wind, 
parent ship [Ref 28: p 
fhe core of the l\'ulka system is a hovering rocket decoy "'ith a 
programmable trajectory. The decoy is launched from the ship to be 
prolected aud hovers for up to two minutes. The programmable trajectory 
allows selection of the optimum ~ight path for seduction o~ inco~i,:,g missile 
Ji~~ri~~n~~e c~~ ~10~:;!O~:O:1~IP~:;Se ~~ 'N~~k:h~:~~mb~~ ~~ss~7_::ant~~; 
capabilily. Its hovering system prevents the wind sbifting the decoy"s (X>sition. 
and it isfired automatically.[Re.f 28: p. 60J 
The Nulka decoy seems like an attractive way to provide for own-ship adense. 'Wilen 
considenng these point defense wcapons, it is ncccssary 10 examine both "hard kill" and 
"soft kill" , and to (;ompare the effectiveness and suitability based on a spt{:ific threal 
Secondly, carrying a large complement of missiles could sustain a ship through a 
longer operation. Adding six more cells to the vertical launChing system (VLS) could 
achicve this. Ao:kIing to that, using helicopter launched anti-ship missiles (ASMs) such as 
Penguin and Hellfire instead of using Harpoon against small ooats , may result in increasing 
the missllc quantity. It IDay be worth pointing out that the }"vlk-41 VLS can carry four Se.1 
Sparrows in a single celL Moreover, World Naval Weapon Systems '[Rcf. 16: p. 4411 
reports 
At the 1990 US Navy League show, FMC, the manufacturer, displayed a cell 
holding two slightly slimmed Sid-series missi les (arranged diagonally), which 
were described as a General Dynamics proposal for a possible follow-on to 
the current SM-2(MR) for tbe mid-1990s 
These combinations of missiles result in not only increasing the total amount of missiles but 
also concealingattual numbers of missiles being carried. 
Thirdly, using airoome assets (;ould extend the survcillance space and over-the-
horizon (OT!-f) capability. By utilizing a higher radar position, the surveillance horizon is 
extended. Two SH-60s a re key for OTH operations. 
The most significant Right IlA upgrade is the addition of a dual h~licopler 
hangar desl,gned to accommodate two SH-60Bs as well as to land, ret ud. and 
rearm a "anety of hehcopters !Delnding Army AH1Ps (OH-58D), Cobras (AH-
1). H-46s, and Comanches (RAH-66), Theaddition of a bangar is pardlleled 
by a s<:parate aequlsltlOn program 10 eqnlp the SH-60D wltb Pengum and 
Hellfire missiles, laser target designator, and forward looking i nfr~red (FU R) 
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sensor_ The heli,-,opters will contribute immeasurably to the ship's surveillance 
and identification capability, and 3lso provide an over-the-horiwII detcct·and -
cngage capability, which is particular!y important agaiost the fast patrol boats 
and dlcsel submarines common to lJUoral ,-,ountnes worldwide . [Ref. 14: p 
38J 
This idea of using helicopters anned with ASMs could be adopted based on the successful 
experiences of the Gulf War in 199 1. 
British Aerospace Sea Skua anti-ship missiles fired from Royal Navy Lynx 
helicopters engaged 19 Iraqi patrol boMs and other craft, sinking four and 
disabling the other 15. [Ref. 29: p. 48) 
Another way to extend the possible ASCM detection range is by putting passive 
sensor:; on ships. Passive sensors include not only traditional ESM, but also electro-optical 
(EO) sensors such as forward looking infrared (RJR) sensors, TV sensors, and laser 
range finders , Actually, these sensors are in service 
US Navy bas fielded airborne EO sensors on its carrier-based Intruder A-6Es, 
Tomcat F-14AiDs, and Hornet F,IA-l80'Ds.it has only deployed a handful of 
shipboard EO sensors, most on board frigates and destroyers tasked with the 
tanker escort mission during the Iran-Iraq War and iu Operation 'Dcsert 
Shield/Desert Storm' [Ref. 30: p. 28) 
ESM can detect a target over the horizon. Even though they provide only direction (beanng 
and elevation) of targets, early warnings increase reaction time for ship commanders and 
also assist in the detection by radar. The reasoning is supponed by the following 
At tbe verY least, the data available can be used to eliminate arcas of no 
interest so' that active sensors can concentrate their searches on more 
productive sectors .. The shift. from all-around to quadrant search greatly 
IDcreases the probabIlity of belDg able to usc radars wIthout being detected: a 
case where the integration of electronic warfare input is of direct benefit to 
other sensor technology_ [Ref. 27: p_ 41) 
It is not fair to ignore the ··communieations intercepts" by passive sensors for targding. 
They can provide Idatively accumte range estimates·'by measuring the difference in anwal 
times between the ground wave and the skywave." [Ref. 27: p. 431 One such system is the 
SSQ-72, commonly called Classic Outboard. The new Outboard II or ·'SSQ-I08(V)2 docs 
away with the need to measure the arrival time of the ground wave and can use single-point 
measurement for determining range." [Ref. 27: p. 44] These sensors increase the efficiency 
of "active homing" missiles which can be programmed to tum on their seeker closer to the 
targe t. However, it is doubtful that communications intercepts by passive sensors will help 
friendly forces neutrJ..iizeASCMs or localize hostile platforms in a crowded littorJ..i regiOn 
In the case where these devices arc used by both Aegis and enemy platforms, the need for 
identification friend or foe (IFF) for wcapons release is of more concern for Aegis ships, 
and consequently of great benefit to hostile forc es. 
14 
Another advantage of passive sensors IS undetactability. It is u.<>eful during tanKer 
escort type missions. if the operation is under emission control (E:v1CON). only passive 
sensors can obtain valuable information. I 'unhermore, there are no multipath or dueling 
problems in IR. The lypical Infrared Search and Track (lRST) devices are the Prench 
Vampir (DlBV 10) developed by SAT m,mufactureI 
HowC\er, the mostlmp;xtantlhing is fusing information from those sensors iUld 
providing useful tactic,aI dal<l to the ship commander rather than Just improving each 
sensor's abilities. NjDS is a tactical dal<l-handling system or combat-direction system 
(CDS) \vhich has the function to coordinate information available on ships However, it 
intcgratcs only active sensors and "hard klll" weapons 
Furthermore, Battle Group AA W Co:xdination (BGAA We) , Force AA \V Coordinating 
Technology (FACT), and C(X)perdtive Engagement Capability (eEC) are working to 
exp:mding the taetiQ] data integration from single ship to the battle group 
The all forms 
naval force 
;t could be (In(liogolls IO the computer work stuion. CEC: is explained in reference [17: p 
39] as tollows: 
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In krms of Aegis 
Aegis ships are now participating in developmental and operational testing of 
the Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS) wich Navy E~2C 
Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft and F-14 Tomcat fighters, Air Fore"" 
and other s"'f"ice players. A fully integrated Link 16/IrIDS system will be 
incorporated in the Hight Il Arleigh Burkes in fisca l years 19%-97. [Ref. 31 
p.51 ] 
Through the U.S. DDG-51 Flight IlA upgrade program discussion and the related 
\iterdlure survey, the outline of the current AA W technologies and the courses of 
improvements are clear. The fo ur mainJXlints of this discussion can be summarized as 
Ivllows : 
\ ) C1WS has to be improved against the emerging ASCMs by using improved 
short range SAMs and "soft kill" weapons. 
2) More weapons carried by each unital sea improve overall response capabili ties 
The key is the combination of missiles to peIfonn operations more efficiently 
3) an-I sensor capability is required. This enccrnpasses two aspects, an extended 
sensor envelope and an extended weapons envelope. 
4) Intcgrationof tactical data should be the backbone of AA W in the future 
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1/1. METHODOLOGY FOR EFFECTIYENESS EVALUATION 
A_ AD WEAPON SYSTEM CHARAcrERlZATION AND BASIC 1\'10DEL 
1. Weapon Lethality 
According to Ball [Ref. 131, the definition of weapon lethality is its ability to 
encounter, engage, and kill a target. These sequential event~ are stochastic in nature 
rherefore lethality is measured by the probability a target will be killed by the weapon, PK 
It IS o bvious that the target sur .... ival and target kill are mutually exclusive events 
Accordingly, this relation is given by 
[Weapon Lethality] = 1"[Targ~tSurvivabili tyl 
P.< ;:: I - Ps (3 .1 ) 
Target survivability is affected by target susccptibi lity, which refers to t h~ inability 
of a target to avoid being hit, and vulnerability, which refers to the weakness of the target 
agains t the given hit. In other words, to kill the target, it must be hit by one o r more 
damage mechanisms associated with the weapon propagator warhead, and the hit(s) by the 
damage mechanisms must [("suit in a target kill. Hence, weapon lethaJityis measured by the 
Joint prolxlbilitythat the target is hit, PH, and killed given the hit, PKlH. 
[Weapon Lethality] = [Target Susceptihility) x [Target Vulncmbility] 
PK = PH PKI:-i (3.2) 
2. SAM Operating Process - One-on-One Encounter· 
According to Ball [Ref. 131, a one-an-one encounter can be divided into five 
st:quential phases and events in the susceptibili ty portion: (1) the AD system must be 
actively searching for targets entering into its searching space (Target exposure), (2) the 
AD system must detect targets (Encounter), (3) the AD system must engage the detected 
target by firing/launching a propagator, such as a bal listic 
(Engagement), (4) the propagator must 'fly out' and intercept the 
the damage mechanisms carried by the warhead on the propagator must hit the target 
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(Endgame). In the very last phase, th~ target vulnerability has to be considered, that IS (6) 
the target must be killed by warhead detonation. Figure 2 illustrates the phases and events 
of detection, launch, fly out, and endgame, with appropriate ranges and times, known as 
time lines. 
Time 
2nd SAM Intercept 
Launched 
Fig. 2. Time Line of Encounter 
1st SAM ASCM 
Launched Detected 
(TFCS: Target Fire Control Solution. KA.: Kill Assessment) 
The outcome of each phase or event is clearly not deterministic. Therefore each 
phase can be represented by the following probabilities: 
p", The probability that the weapon system is active and ready to encounter 
p rjA The comlitionai probability that the weapon system will dctccta target given 
that the weapon system is ;.t<::tivc. 
PUD: The conditional prolnbi li ty that the target has been tracked, a fire control 
solution is obtaincd, and a propagator is launched at the target, given tbatit 
has been detected hy the active weapon system 
Plir...: The conditional probability that the propagator 'Oys' out, possihly guided 
through the midcourse and terminal phases, and successfully intercepts the 
target 
PHlI: The condition_ probability that the warhead hiL~ or effectively detonates, 
which is dependent on warhead type, against the target, given successful 
conditions above 
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PKJH" T he condItional probability given thallhc target is killed by the hit or 
detonation. 
Thus the prohahililY that the target is killeri is in as foll ows, 
PK:=o PHPWK= ( PA PDlAPLJDPriLPHir ) PKiH (3.3) 
E .. timatioll of the lclhalityof the weapon is one of the hardest questions to answer. 
It depends not only on the weapon parameters but a lso on the target perfonnanec 
represeTlted by susceptibility and vulnerability. In addition, environmental factors and the 
scenano also affect it. Usually weap::lll lethality is provided by the manufacturN based on 
some spxific simulation or by historical data. An example is the demonstrated lethality of 
Harpoon wluch ha~ been about 93% in3741aunches(lOO% sin(;c 1982) [Ref. 16: p. 1871. 
3. Lethality Assessment 
Lei us devote a li ttle morc space to dis(;ussing what the reasonable estimations or 
assumptions for each of the above probabili ties are in order to use them in a spread sheet 
model 
First, p" stands for mainly weapon system rehabilityand readiness in the given 
envIronment. It could be assumed PA := 1.0 for simplicity. However if a system consists of 
sevcral platforms and the activity of each of pla tforms affects the total system outcome, it 
could be better to consider the PA of each platform. 
Secondly, PDI'A could be a variable of the range from the AD sensors. It means we 
can expect that an initial detection of a particular target occurs at some specific range with a 
particular probability. To put it another way, under the given conditions, we may estimate 
the detection range, RD, at which point PD/A changes from 0.0 10 LO. For example, 
suppose we cannotdetctt the target unti l it hits the AD system. The detection mnge is zero. 
However, in reality we cannot esti mate the detection range exactly because of uncertain 
information of conditions, especially cnvironmental faclOn; such as sea state, dueting and 
multi path effects, e tc_ Therefore, we suppose the AD system can always detect the target at 
the radar horizon based on the radar height and a target altitude. Then. some probabi lity 
dis tribution w hich represents the likelihood of the target deJection occurring within small 
range intervals, will be applied to the entire range. 
rhirdly, Ptiocan be represented by the time delay or reaction time, since the most 
interesting aspect in this phase is how fas t we can fire/ launch after initial detection. Thus, 
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we assume PL'Dbecomes 1.0 after some time delay from detection and ~hange it by a given 
condition in the same way as the relationship between PdA and RO). It also seems 
reasonable to say that the reaction time can be divided into thrcc parts. These are the initial 
reaction time, dt!, the target fire control solution time delay, dts, and the launcher reaction 
time, dlL Du "consists of gelting personnel in 'combat ready' p::lsitions and transferring 
the equipment from a standby alert status to a fully operational status." [Ref. 21: p. 95J It 
represents the combat condition status and the training level. Dts stands for the time for 
firing based on the capability of combat system and the commander's final decision. It must 
be necessary to figure out the target location, flight path, and status which is based on the 
interrogation of IFF before firing. DtLrepresents launchercharacteristies. 
At last, we assume that the remaining probability comp::lnents PIll.., PHIl, and PKlH 
can be lumped together and represented by one probability, PKSS, or the probability the 
target is killed given a single shot. The main reason is that in order to estimate these values, 
we need to run simulations at very high resolution by using specific weap::ln and target 
characteristics values. These data are usually cla~sified. Thus, the study of these detailed 
simulations lies outside the scope of this paper. Consequently, PKss is a~sumed to be given 
and is used as an input variable. 
4, Layered Defense 
In essence, air dcl"ensc at sca is 'Iaycrcd' from the point of origin of thc threat 
to its intended {X)int of impact. LRef. 32: p. 50} 
In general layered defense or defcnse-in-depth consists of basically p::lintlorganic 
defense and area defense. In case of a U.S. earlier battle group, the area defense divided 
into two layers: the fighter engagement zone (FEZ), where the combat air patrol aircraft 
(CAP) and deck launched interceptor (DU) fight the approaching enemy fighters and 
bombers, and the missile engagement 7..One (MEZ) using long and medium range SA Ms. 
However in this thesis we assume no supp::lrt of CAP and focus on the very low altitude 
where the radar horizon lies as one of the most restrictive conditions. Therefore, as shown 
in Figure 3, it is bener to define the outer-most layer as the Over the Horizon (arH) SAM 
engagement zone and the nex.t layer as the long range SAM engagement zone. This zone is 
r~trieted by the ship-board illuminator horizoo for semi -active homing missiles. We 
assume the short range point defense weapons guard the last defended area. This consists 
of three layers based on maximum effective range. They are the short range SAM layer, the 
Gun layer, and the combined CIWS and soft kill weupon layer. We assume that each five 
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weapon layers has its own PKSS against an ASCM, and the PKSS is constant within the 
layer_ 
4th Layer: Gun Range 
5th Layer: CTWS Range 
3rd Layer: Short SAM Range 
Fig. 3. Aegis AA W Layer 
5. Assumptioll of ASCM Flight Profile 
The flight profile mooe] of ASCM is simplified to a straight path holding conslant 
altitude as shown in Figure 4. The ASCM is characterized by its average incoining speed 
(au input value) in our model. The cruising altitude (an input value) affects the ;.Jdar 
hori7Dn. The otheras]X"-cts of the ASCM such as maneuverability, are lncluded in the PKss 
for ,\egis weapons in each layer which is an input value. 
Fig. 4. ASCM Right Profile and Rada; Horizon 
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The target of the ASCM can be either the Aegis ship or a FSU which is stationed at 
some point away fmm Aegis. If an ASCM is approaching the FSU, the threat axis is 
defined as the line passing through the ASCM and FStJ positions. The worst case scenario 
in terms of the available Aegis reaction time is when the Aegis ship is also on that axis bUl 
behind the FSU . This situation also allows us to ignore the bearing of a target. Thus, the 
model becomes two dimensional (2-D), range and height If it is reasonable to assume the 
AegIS propagators (guns and mi ssiles) fly out with constant horizontal speed, the simplest 
,)ne dimensional mooel ( I-D) can be used. 
6. Computation of Aegis Lethality 
To estimate the Aegis lethality against an ASCM, we compute an intercept point, 
RlNT, of an Aegis propagator and the ASC/I.{ In the.simplcst I-D case, the time from the 
initial detection to the interception, TINT, is given by: 
T (RDEr -(dt;+dts+ dtL)'V"ocM) 
!Nt = (YSAM+YASQ,l) (3 .4) 
where ROETis the initial delectionrange, (dll +dts+dtL) is tile total time delay mentioned in 
the previous section, and YSAM and VASCM are tile average horizontal speed of the Aegis 
propagator and the ASCM respectively. Then, by using TIm, R!m is estimated by' 
(3.5) 
If RIm is greater than RMAx, the maximum fly OUI of the Aegis SAM, the first shot is 
delayed until the intercept would occur at R\.1AX. After this first engagement, the Aegis 
needs some time to determine the results of the shot, which is referred to as the target kill 
assessment (TKA) . If the first shot is detennined to be a failure. a second shot is launched 
lmmccliatclyafter the target fire control solution (TFCS) is obtained. It is noted that the time 
delay due to the TKA to TFCS is much less than the delay from the initial detection to the 
TFCS of the first shot. The ncxt intercept timcaftcr the finit intercept is given by' 
T (RlNf -( dt"" +dtL)·YAS01 ) 
= - IV,,"+ V+~) (3 .6) 
where dlKA is the time delay of TKA and TFCS. T he sUbsequent intercept ranges are 
caleulated us ing Equation n.5) and (3 .6) 
When examll1ing the in te rcept range, the launch ing sys tem should be considered. 
The Mk-4l Vertical Ulunch System (VLS) is ins talled on the Aegis instead of a trainabl e 
launching system. such as Mk-26 GMLS. The features of VLS are to eliminate the 
launcher sweep motion and to send a SAM toward a low air density al ti tude as fas t as 
possible. El iminationof former results in increasing the launching speed, especially against 
simultaneous multi-direction attacks. and also increasing the system reliability since it is a 
multi -parallel system. The lalterreduces drag and increases the SAM speed. Consequently. 
it allows fast and long range interception even though the fligh t path is longer. Howcver, in 
case of shooting at a short rangc target, this longcr flight path would cause a longer 
inte rcept time. T he manufacturer of Rolling AitfrruneMissil e (RAM) argued that 
the crucial 'Oy out ' time to 
1"0 include up and over trajectory, the 1-0 mooel should be mo::l ified imo 2-0. However, 
to consider the de tailed guidance and propulsion of Aegis/SM-2 missi le system is not the 
point of this thesis. Thc available data is also scarce. Therefore, the modi fication to the 
missile fligh t path to account for a vertica l launch is limited to a very simple PropOltional 
Navigation (PN) guidance program to simulate a SAM 2-D fl ight profile. Further 
modifi cations are left for future study .. A.ppendix B describes this PN program 
After the intercept points are detennined, appl ying the given PKss at eaeh ~in t 
results in the probabil ity of target ki ll at that poi nt. If the individual encounters are assumed 
to be independent events , the target survivabili ty. or the probabi li ty of a "lcaker" after N 
shots, Ps, is given by 
(3 .7) 
On referri ng to Equatio:; (3 .1 ) . the ;ethalityof Aegis is 
(3.8) 
In our Acgis AA W model , there are five layers. each of which has a fixed P KSS. If the total 
number of possible encounters within the ith layer is N(i), the fo llowing eq uat ion is 
obtained 
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By using Equation (3.9), the lethality of Aegis due to several points is computed. 
7, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
Select measures of dfectiveness that relate directly to a system's performance 
characteristics and to mission acomplishmenl. Dicisioll makers need to know 
the contribution of the system to the outcome of hattie. not Just how far il can 
shout or how fast it can fly. [Ref JJ: 8-8] 
(3.9) 
It is useful to examine the method by which theJMSDF Aegis destroyer operational 
effectiveness should be measured. Even though Ihe different missions require differen t 
outcomes, it seems reasonable to characterize mission requirements by establishing "a 
denial area at an acceptable risk". A denial area at an acceptable risk refers to that area of 
coverage by Aegis within which it has an desirable level of lethality PKagainst an air target, 
such as an ASCM. If no FSU loss is required during a mission, the acceptable risk is 0.0, 
whIch is the same as a 1.0 lethality against the threats. What must be clear is that the 
lethality provided by Aegis at some point is not always equal to the tota1lelhality at that 
point. The rcason is that it may be enough for Aegis to provide 0.8 lethality to a FSU in 
order to achieve a total 0.95 scenario lethali ty. This is because the FSU has some self 
defense weapons which provided some 1cthalityagainst threats such as 0.75. 
From this point of view, missions can be categorized into two types: tanker escort 
and blocade. The tanker or high value unit (HVU) cscort which is a traditional mission of 
theJMSDF. In Ihis operation, there is no reason for stationing the tankers away from the 
escort ship. The only concern is to kill the ASCMs before they hit the tankers. It is not so 
imPJrtant to be able to kill ASCMs a long distance away. It implies the denial area is smail, 
probably a circle with a few thousand yards diameter and fixed. However, what is expected 
is no risk (zero leakcrs) within this given area. Therefore the measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) is how much lethality can be expected at thc given rangc at the edge of the denial 
area_ In other words, we want higher lethality in a fixed volume of space. 
The other type of mission includes blockades for protecting a maneuvering friendly 
force , or securing a free shipping area. Here, it is desired to expand the denial area as mu.:::h 
as poSsible for these operations. As the denial area is expanded, Aegis can nOl provide hi gh 
lethality to the entire area. The possibility of a "Ieaker" which penetrates the Aegis area 
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defense and proceeds 10 ils target could increase. Therefore, the FSU has a certain risk o f 
l\SCM penetrdtion. The acceptable level of risk is dependent on the mission. If some 
deterrent effect<; or presence is desired, the capability of denying as large a space as 
possible could he very impoltant even though the actual lethality is not so high. T hus the 
MOE for this type of mission is how much area can be secured within a required lethality 
It is also rC-ilSonable to use this MOE to evaluate the operational flexibility or mul ti -mission 
capability. 
To sum up, a given mission is characterized by the two associated concepts of 
"denial area" and '"ac..."eptablerisk". It is reasonable to use the lethaJityprovided by Aegis as 
a parameter of "acceptablcrisk" since it implics the quantity of p::lssible "leaters", It is also 
right to adopt the range where required Aegis lethality level is a(;hieved as a parameter of 
"denial area". As a result, we examine the efrectiveness in tWO ways. 
I) What level of Aegis lethality can be expected ata given required range? 
2) What range can be secured with required Aegis Iethalitylevcl? 
The former is suitable for tanker escort type missions. The Janer represents the 
appropriateness of area expansion type missions. It also provides the b.'!Sic infonnation to 
estimate how many ships we need to cover a required area. In a sense. it represents the 
operational flexibi lity since the larger area implies the grater pJtential of a variety of 
One more important element that should he considered regarding the expected 
capability of Aegis is the role of the intelligence center as a battle field manager. Because of 
its complexity. this is difficult to quantify. Consequently, it will be subjectively examined 
later. 
8. Expected Value Spread Sheet 
To mea~ure the operational clfe(;tiveness of Aegis AD, computed lethalities are 
compared to the required lethality, PKR (an input value). which represents the "acceptable 
risk" derived rroma mission . Then, the point at which PKRis achieved is pICked out as the 
edge of the "denial are.."'!". When the required range, RR (an input value) , which represents 
the ·'denial area" of a mission is given. the lethali ty at this point is the value at the neare.<;t 
Ollter mtercept pomt 
Additional assumptions are a~ follows: 
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I) If the ASCM is delectedonce, it will never be lost. 
2) The weapon system is always active. In other words, the system re liabi lity is 
1.0 
3) A series of shots from the gun is represented by the first shot with the given 
PKss(4) which is the cumulative value of the series, For example, if the PKSS lS 
0.02 and 25 shots are expected within the cffectivc range, PKss(4) is 0.3965. 
4) In the CIWS layer, PKss(5) represents combined effectiveness of "hard kill" 
and "soft ki ll" wcapons. The intercept occurs only once at a fixed point 
5) The minimum effective range, Rmin, of a weapon is same as thc maximum 
effectivcrange, Rmax, of the next inner layer weapon. 
6) The firing doctrine is "shoot-look-shoot". If "shoot-shoot-look" is used, the 
two shots are lwnped into one shot. It means the input val ue of PKSS is 
changed. For example, if the PKSS is 0.7 in "shoot-look-shoot", then the PKSS 
is changed to 0.91 in order to estimate the "shoot-shoot-look" doctrine case 
7) As long as the estimated intercept range is longer than the Rmir:. the weapon 
continues to fire. If iris less than Rmin, the next innerwcapon will be fircd. 
9. Simulation with Crystal Ball 
In reali ty, input variables such as PKSS, time delay, initial detection range is not 
cx;u;tly the expected values. They include uncertainty in nature which could be rcprescnted 
by a certain probability dcnsity function (pdf). To asscss the effcct of stochastic events, 
Monte CarJo simulation can be used. If we have the expected values spread shect. these 
variance effects are easily included by us ing the add in program named Crystal Bali. 
Crystal Ball is used to account for the probabilistic pdf naturc of thc input variables and to 
assess the probability of the output results. 
'" You can describe a range of possible va lues for each uncertain cell in your 
spreadsheet. Everything you know about each assumption and hbw it affects 
your result is expressed all at once 
* Using a process called Maute Carlo Simulation, Crystal Ball displays your 
results in a forecast chart that shows the entire range of possible outcomes and 
the likelihood of achieving each of them. In effect. Crystal Ball moves you 
beyond "what -if ' scenarios by providing an accura te statistical picture of 
the range of possibilities associated with your assumptions. [Ref. 34, p. 15J 
U!Jng th is program, a certain a~sumed pdf is applied on the initial. detecti.on range cell in the 
I;,:o;pecied value spread shcctand the first intereept rx>int i.~ observed a~ a foreca.~t cell value 
In crder to underslatld the cffectofvariabilityof initial detection range. 
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10. Monte Carlo Simulation Spread Sheet 
A Monte Carlo simulation spread shttt was devdojXd in order to examine the 
consumption of Aegis \veafXJns during a mission and the effediveness of using an FS U' s 
point defense system, \vhich is combined with Aegis area defense weapons. The weapo:1. 
consllmption is critimlprohlcm, especially in a mission that includes TBlvfD 
To install a point defense system on an FSC could be another option to increase the 
Sllccess of a mission. It would be worth1.vhile to simulate this silllation. The 
computation is same as the expected value ID model. The number of each weapon. the 
FSl) ?Osition from Aegis, a PKSS of FSU point defense system, and the expected number 
of ASC\,.1 attacks are added as input variables. Each atlack occurs sequenrially. \Vtuch 
target, the Aegis or the FSU, an ASCM wiL atlackis determined by an input variable of the 
attack ratio of FSU. If every ASC.:v1 atlac.:ks to thc FSU, the attack ratio is 1.0. If the L,U-fret 
is Aegis, th!"; attack ratio is 0.0. If equally attacked, the ratio is 0.5. However, if Aegis is 
killed, all remaining ASC.:v1s will attack the rst:. When the FSU is ·sunk, this tria] is 
terminated and the mission is a failure. \\'hen the FSU survives against all arracks, tte 
mission is a success, even if the AegIS is damaged. The condition of a ship kill is defmed 
by the user as a number of necessary hit~ 10 kill the target ship. 
Both the expected value spread sheet and the :\.-10nte Carlo simulation are made b:-
using the i'vficrosoft Excel version 5.0 for :\.-iacintosh Example spread sheets and T:le 
programs are shown in Appendix C and D respectively 
B. EXAMPLE CASE STCDY 
This thesis focuses on the cpcrational effectiveness fel the area expansion t,,?C 
mission in a littoral area using long rang!"; SAMs. A study of improving the point defecse 
system for own-ship survivability, such a~ thc effectiveness of w!";apons eombinalion, or a 
shan range SAM improving, arc left for a future study. Improvements of the SA\1 area 
defense system components due to a reduced time delay, an increased SAM speed, 
increased SAM maximum 'dnge, and an increased detcctionrange will be examined 
1. Base Aegis System and Threat 
a, Base Aegis System 
The currentJMSDF Aegis is assumed 10 be characterized as follows 
Radar height: 55 feet 
Illuminator height 60 feet 
The maximum range of SAM: 40 NM (it is also limited by the illuminatorhoJizon) 
No short range SAJ\'I nor OTH SAM 
Detection range: Radar horizon 
The time delays are listed in Table 3 
Chardcteristics of weapons are listed in Table 4 . 
Table 3. Base Aegis Time Delay 
Weapon OTHSAM SAM Short SAM 
Speed(Maeh) 2.0 
PK 0.7 
max. R(NM) 40flH 
dtL(sec) 2.0 
(lH: Illuminator Horizon) 







In this study, we focus on a "sea-skimmer". The incoming altitude is taken 
as 40 fcctabove water. As seen in Chapter iI, supersonic sea-skimmers, such as ANS with 
l\.1ach 2 .0, Maskit with Mach 3.5, are the most dangerous threats in the foreseeable future 
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Therefore, the impact of supersonic ASCMs is examined. A subsonic ASCM (Mach 0 .9 
like Exocet) case is the reference standard of current system lelhali ty level. 
2. lmprovement Requests 
It IS obvious that there are two big constrJints in the base Aegis system. One is !.he 
de tection range, which is limited hy the radar horizon, 16.9 NM. Jt means a denial area 
cannot be expanded beyond 16.9 .'JM even if an effective .veapon range is more than that 
The other constraint is the illuminator horizon of SAM launched ship since a semi-active 
homing missile require a tenninal guidance by an illuminator. Thus. the weafXIn envelop of 
the base system is limited to 17.3 NM in this case. If a mission requires more denial area 
than 17.3 NM radius, the \veapon envelope has to be expanded by using other missile and 
guidance systems_ Without this, the other improvements are useless_ However, if a 
mission is achievable within the base system's possible denial area, the requirement would 
be to keep this denial area against future threats. Thus, we will examine how denial area 
shri nks by supersonic sea-skimmers and find the effective solutions to keep a reference 
denial area 
Suppose a mission requires more than 10 NM at a 0.3 acceptable nsk as the 
reference standard. The 0.3 acceptable risk, which means the 0.7 Aegis lethality, implies 
that an edge of the denial area is same as the first intercept point of the SAM. It means this 
range is the maximum possible denial area of a system, since it is impossihle to expand a 
denial area beyond the fi rst intercept point. Therefore, using this acceptable risk should be a 
good way to focus on the essential clements of area expansion. However, to examine the 
possibility of more than two salvos is also important since '·a missile carrying decoys and 
jammers couJd. in theory, neutralize the first salvo and also confuse damage assessment" 
[Ref. 20: p. 43J Therefore, the range at 0.9 PKSS, where the ASCM has to be intercept 
twice, is also examined. 
3. What If Analysis of Expected Value Model 
First 01 all, to judge the base Aegis system. the change of ranges at PK =0.7 and at 
PK=0. 9 against the increased speed of ASCM will be observed. Then , using this results as 
a reference standard. the following five improvements alternatives will be compared. 
1) ",ihat if the time delay. from initial detection to SAM launching, can be reduced 
to 5 seconds or3 seconds from 10 seconds of base case'! 
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II implies that higher target lracking ro.tc, increasing fire control computatio~ 
time and launcher reaction limc, trained person, higher weapon condition, etc .. 
2) What if the SAM average horizontal speed can be increased to Mach 3.0 or 4.0 
from Mach 2.0 of ba~e case'! 
It would includes actual SAM speed up and optimum flight path. 
3) What if combined abovc hvo improvements can be done? 
4) What if the initial detection range can be expanded? 
It means mainly using off-board sensors. The assumption nCI -: is that Aegis can 
launch a SAM by using the target data from external soun;es. In other words, 
thc direct target detection by SPY -1 is not required 
5) What if the variability of detection range can be reduced? 
It implies the mnlti-sensors fusion. Using assnmed distribution in the "Crystal 
Ball" and try to gra~p a general idea. 
4. What If Analysis of Monte Carlo Simulation 
Suppose Aegis is loaded with 60 SAMs, the stationing point of the FSU is within 
the denial area at PK= 0.9, and 10 ASCManacks are expected during mission. Thc relation 
of the hostile attack intention, the FSU self-defense capability , and SAM consumption will 
be considered. As example study, the attack ratio is taken a~ 0.5 and 1.0. The FSU self-
defer,, 3C capability is examined the cases of P.K =0.0 and 0.5. A single hit on a FSU by an 




1. Improvement Alternatives - Expected Value Spread Sheet 
Figure 5 shows the change of the ooge of the two denial areas, (PKo:oO_7 and 
P"o:o O.9) due to an ASCM' s speed. In other words, the line for PK=O_7 represents the first 
Intercept pam! against an ASCM, and PK=O_91 is the second intercept PJint. Suppose a 
mission requires more than a 10 NM radius of denial area and the minimum effective runge 
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ASCM Speed (M ach) 
Fig_ 5_ Intercept Range of Base Aegis 
The base Aegi s system can handle a lv1ach 0.9 ASCM_ However, when the ASCM 
is approaching supersonically, it cannot secure the requiroo mission area, and more than 
1.5 Mach ASCM would pennlt only one intercept chance prior to the minimum SAM 
effective range. Clearly, the base Aegis ha~ to be improved to deal with a supersonic sea· 
skimmer. 
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Figures 6 and 7 indicate the impact of reducing the reaction time delay. They reveal 
that this course of action gives very little benefit. From another point of view, margin<l1 
effectiveness is small since the Aegis combat system is already at high level, and also the 
human reaction time and IFF may be the dominant factors of time delay. Furthennore, a 
fully automatic weapon condition is imJXlssible in the littoral area in pmctice, because a 
weapon release is usually restricted by rules of engagement. Although a noticeable point in 
this improvement is thatthe sensitivity is increasing as ASCM's speed is faster, it does no, 
contribute to the area of expansion so much. 
::~---------------- ------------------rr==~----=-=-~:~>~=>C=.A~c=g,=.9~ 
r: •••• ~ 
-- -- -- ---------- ---------- ------- ---- -- -- -- -1 
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ASCM Speed (Mach) 
Fig. 6. Reduclion 01 Time Delay (PK=O.7) 
----------::::::-::::::::::::::::::::::-:::1 
-- -1 
-- - ------ -i 
3.5 
ASCM Speed (Mach) 
Fig. 7 . Reduction of Time Delay (py"=O.9\) 
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Figures 8 and 9 show the impact of increasing SAM speed. It is bener than the 
reduction of time delay improvement, especially in Ow opponunity of the second shot. 
However, it doesn't seem to be enough improvement, and also the improvemcnl effect is 
gJ<\duaJl y diminishing as ASCM is fas ter. Adding to that, the increase of SI\M speed would 
affect the PKSS. If the increasing speed causes a reduction of PKss, the obvious 
improvement is to just e:<tend the possible maximum intercept rdllge a couple of miles, 
since no manerwhallhe level of lethality wc can get, it is better than nothi ng. 
'" ,---J~ •••  
2 -------------------- ---------- ------------i 
2-5 
ASCM Speed (Mach) 
Fig. 8. Increase of SAM Speed (PK=O.70) 
~:: :::::::::::: ::::~:::: I __ ;==_;:~~e~l 
f':~J 
ASCM Speed (M ach ) 
fig . 9_ Increase of SAM Speed (PK=O.91) 
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Figures 10 and II show the impact of combining the two improvements (time delay 
and SAM speed): using Mach 3.0 SAM with 5 scconds reaction time and Mach 4.0 SAM 
with 3 seconds reaction time. This improvement could be effective against at most a M'lCh 
2.0 ASCM. However. even though two com[XlOcnts, combat system and SAM, can be 
successfully improved, we can ncver neutraIizea "Moskit" missile tnwelingat Mach 3.5. 
ASCM Speed (M..ch) 




ASCM Spe=l (~ch) 
FIg. 11. Reducllon of Tlrue Delay and Increase 01 SAM Speed (PK::;O.91) 
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Compared to these improvements, the effort of expanding the sensor envelope to 40 
NM or 60 NM leads to vCTy impressive results. As seen In Figure i 2 for a40 NM detection 
range, the first intercept range is dramatica!!y extended. We can achieve to secure 10 NM 
radius of mission areaagains! a Mach 3.5 ASCM by extending the detection range up to 40 
NM. In ca<;e of getting a 60 NM delectionrange, Aegis can use the lIlaximllrn range of the 
SAM (17.3 NM), which is limned by the illuminator honzon, even though an ASCM'~ 
speed is Mach 3.5. Furthennorc, Figure 13 shows that a 60 NM rddius of detection 
envelop:: could guardlltce the mtercept of the second shot beyond the mini mum effecti ve 
SAM rdnge. The only conccrncou]d be the reduction of PKSS by using off-board sensors 
for the SAM guidance. However. thc second shot could be guided from .the launched ship 
by usmg own SPY -1_ It means the expected PKSS for the second shot is ~e as the base 
Aegis system. The intercept fX)illl of second shot is almost lhe same as the first intercept 
point of the base AegIS. Thereforc, the degmdation would be minimized 
1--BascAegb ----20NM - - -40NM --60NiVI I 
_1 4 
'" e 1 2 --- - -
~1O 
'" f 8 
:§ 6 
4 
0+--------+- - --+------1-----" 
0.5 1.5 L5 3.5 
ASCM Speed (Mach) 
Fig. 12. Extension of Detection Range (PK= 0.7) 
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18 --- --- - -.-.-.-------.-------- - ------.-.--- -------.----- -
-I 16 --- --- - --- -- -- - - ---- -- - --- - --
•••• ~. - ---::::::::~ 
0.5 1 .5 2.5 3.5 
ASCM Speed (Mach) 
Fig. 13. ExtenSIon of Detccnon Range (PIC =0. 7) 
To understand the range and time line of sequential events in these scenarios, let's 
look at it another way. Figure 14 shows the remaining time of each improvemental!emative 
until a Mach 0.9 ASC:vI hits Aegis. From right to left, each component of the bar 
represents a sequential event: Initial detection to getting a tlrget fire control solution 
(TFCS) , TFCS to launching the first SAM, the SAM fly-out to intercepting the target, kill 
assessment to the second SAM launching, the second SAM fly-out and intercepting the 
target. Thus, the left most part of the bar tells the remaining time when the second intercept 
can occur. Figure 17 shows the range from Acgis instead of the remaining time in Figure 
14. Figures 15 and 18 are the Mach 2.0 ASCM case, and Figures 16 and 19 are the Mach 
3.5 ASCM casco To extend the detection range stretches the bar size instead of just 
changing the ratio of each component. The imponant (Xlint is the TFCS to the first SAM 
launch. Extension of th is allows an intercept of the target at the maximum range of the 
SAM. It provides the room for compensating the Aegis for the variability of the ini tial 
detection range and time delay. In addition to that, it allows the future cxl!ension of SAM 
maXlmumrange. 
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Fig. 14. lmprovement Alternatives and Sequenual Events (Time): Mach 0.9 ASCM 
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FIg. 15. Improvement AlternatIves and SequentIal Events (Time): M1Ch 2.0 ASCM 
~teeTiou Range 4Ol'<r.-1 
SAM Sp"ed Mach 4.0 
100,00 150,00 
RemainiIlg Tim~ (sec) 
FIg. 16. Improvement AlternatIves and SequentIal Events (1lme): lvlach 3.5ASCM 
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Fig. 18. Improvement Alternatives and Sequenual EvenL~ (Range) : Mach 2.0 ASCM 
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Fig. 19. Improvement AlternatIves and Sequenual Events (Range): Mach 3.5 ASCM 
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2. Reducing Variability of Initial Detection Range - Crystal Ba ll 
Figures 20 and 22 show the assumption of probability density functions of iniual 
detection range. These are not based on any data but are assumed d istnbutions to show the 
effect of variabi lity. The results of 100 tnalsof Monte Carlo Simulation by Crystal Ball are 
shown In F igures 21 and 23. Examining the two results shows sensllivity o f de1eCllon 
range is very important. The effon of reducing the variability of detection range is crucial . 
Fig. 20. Assumption of Detection Range pdf (I) 
Forecast: Range @Pk=0.7 
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Fig. 21. Intercept Range Forecast (1) 
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Fig. 22. Assumption of Detection Range pdf (2) 
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3. FSU Selr-Derense Capability ... Monte Carlo Simulation Spread 
Sheet 
Table 5 shows the result of 100 trials of each case. 
Attack Ratio LO AtlackRatio 0.5 
FSU Self Prohahilityof AverageSAM ProbabiJityof AverageSAM 
Defense Mission Consumption Mission Consumption 
Capahility Success Success 
0.0 0.4 8.7 0.48 10.1 
0.5 U.66 10.8 0.7 11.3 
Table 5. Results of Monte Carlo Simulation Spread Sheet 
This results shows clearly that if continuous ASCM anacks arc predicted during a 
mission, it is difficult for Aegis to guarantee the FSU protection particularly one without 
any self"defense. In other words, to keep a certain level of acceptable misslOn risk in a 
multl-ASCMattack, the requirement of tolal lethality level becomes very high. Therefore. it 
could be dangerous to rely only on the Aegis air defense weapon system. Furthermore. it 
could be \echnicaHyeasy and cost less 10 install a point defense system on an FSU instead 
of improving the Aegis areadefcnsc lethali ty 
B. SUMMARY 
The ahove results arc swnmarized as follows: 
1) Emerging supersonic sea-skimmers would obsolete the effOit of reducing time 
delay and incr<:asing SAM speed. 
2) Expanding the sensor envelope wuld be most effectiveeoursc of action 
3) Reducing variability of target detection range is imp:mant. It could be 
accomplished using multi-sensors 
4) A high level of lethality is required to c1iminatethe continuou~ ASCM attack 
5) A sell-defense weapon system on the FSU is desirable. 
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V. RECOMMENDING AAW ASSETS FOR JMSDF 
As seen in the previous Chapter, the expansion of Ihe detection sensor envelop is au 
essential faClor for improving Aegis Ie thali tyagainsL ASCMs in the view of "a denial area". 
The next step is to Identify the allcmatives of AA W assets to be considered. To ddeffiune 
the set of possible solutions, DoDlnSlruction 5000.2 M [Ref. 33J suggCSlS: 
contmlUng 
~1[~~l~~ent 
A. EXTERNAL SENSORS 
The upgrade of SPY-I O, called SPY -IE, was announced and is "i ntended for 
greater effectiveness against sea-skimmers." [Ref. 16: p.338] It may be effective in the 
adverse environments. such as sea clutter and mullipath effects, however. it cannot 
overcome the radar horizon limit.atiOIl . Adding to that , a single radar dependent system 
would have deficiencies: 
A single SOUIce or sensor is uu likeJy . within the foreseeable future, to pro'ide 
sufficient rellable identification for an engagement to be malle The 
combination of inputs from different sensor types at several local i on~ to form 
a recognil.ed air picture ot"l.P) does, however, allow the allegIance of a 
particular track - friendly , enemy or neutral - to be determined with a hig h 
level of confidence_ [Ref 25: p_ 335J 
future a~t i -air detection and tracking systems will probably be optical and 
passive lD nature and slgDlflcantly more Jamresistant. [Ref. 9: p.48J 
These statements imply that using multi -sensors. especially passive sensors. and increasing the 
number of sensor platforms are desirable. There are four types of sensor platforms: a suface 
(ground or ship) base. an air base, underwater (submarine) base and a space (satellite) base. In 
terms of AA W. tbe air base system, commonly called airborne early warning (AEW), and 
satellite base system look anraclive since they could expand the sensor envelope dramatically 
However. introducing a satellite for Japanese Self Defense Force (JDSF) is a topic beyond 
the AA \Vtactical improvement of JMSDF Therefore. this option will be pui aside 
Now. it may be wonhwhile 10 extend the study into the TBMD. Pitts studied the 
contribution of Aegis to the TBMD in his master thesis_ [Ref. 35] He conduded' 
the two most critica l Items needed to make Aegis an effective. flexible and 
mobile ballistic mIssile defellse platform are enemaI sources of cuein~ and a 
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warhead a~d missile with proper guidance and control tha t can defeat all 
future balhstlc missile threats. [ReL 15: p. 81) 
The importance o f external cueing sources are to minimize the degradation of AAW 
missions caused by adding the TBMD mission. T he cause of the degradation is explained 
Because of the ballistic missile's extrcmely high speed and high trajectory. the 
energy requlIed in upgrades to direct the radar to higher altitudes and to 
search a large spar.e volu r" <l in a ballistic missile defense mode is \'ery 
significant. DetectIOn and l:a<..king also requires more energy bccause of the 
complicated geometry of th" problem. While the Aegis is in a ballist ic missile 
defense mode, significant degradations are made to its other AA W missions 
fRef. 35: p. 79] 
The r.:llson that the external cue ing sonrccs are effective is that they providc early warning 
about the target 10 the Aegis 
If (he cue were snfficiently accurate, the Acgis would on have to look into 
limited search volume to acquire the target Thc hen.efil the cue would he 
III minimiZing the ume II takes the AN/SPY -1 to acqUire Ih~ ,.nget. ThiS would 
allow for earlier engagement and minimize the impact of its ballistic missile 
defense mission on overall AA W mission. [Ref. 35: p. 69] 
Expanding the sensor cnvelope by using external platforms is also desirable for TBMD. 
Although his recommendation is to use a satel li te as a external source, there is room for 
other AEW type platfonns 
Another important expected functi on of Aegis is as an intelli gence center of the 
battle group. In other words, the AegiS plays a role on gathering and providing a real·time 
hattle field :tuational awareness. This is based on the high perfonnance of the Aegis 
system 
The display system can also store up to 40 patte rns, slich as fo rmation 
diagrams, anchorages, and amphibious boat la n~s_ It can automatically ini tiate 
up to 16 simultaneous track histori.::s unti l order~d to stop doing so. It can 
provide digital maps of the area in which the ship is operating, refreshing 
own·ship position every 2_5 sec 
Aegis as a whole is credited with the abil ity to handle 128 tracks. The SPY-] 
radar can actually handle more, the extra capacity being used to avoid 
overflow _ [Ref_ 16: p_ 352) 
Reponedly. SPY -1 can scan a hcmisphere of 175 NM rad ius. [Ref. 16: p. 338] It is \-ery 
powerful, especially in an open ocean. However. because of the lack of external sensors, 
the JlvlSDF Aegis cannot usc th is capability in a littoral area. 
From the above discussion, it is reasonahle to consider an AEW platforms as a 
extcrnal sensor for the JMSDF Aegis. Furthermore, imrcx:lucing an airborne asset to the 
JMSDF Aegis would open some oourses of SAM improvements since it could also be used 
as a rclay point of guidance commands between SA?--,1 and launched ship or an illuminator 
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platform for terminal guidance, and so on. Although the ideaof using AEW as an "eye' of 
the Oeet is not new, the JXItential of new types of platforms arc rc<.:ently in the limelight 
Airborne early warning is aln:ady important. but improvements in the missiles 
may make it attractive to build balloons Of long-endurance, unmanned air 
vehicle horne radars merely to detect and track missiles before they appear 
over a ship's horizon. [Ref. 29, p43] 
There are Ihrf"-c categories of hEW alternatives from the view of maritimeoperations 
without a carrier: a shipb:Jard AE\V helicopter , an unmanned air vehicle (UA V), and an 
airship 
B. AEW SHIPBOAR» lIELTCOPTER 
A shipboard helicopter is now an indcspensable aSSet for the ASW mission 
JMSDF has eight SH-60Js in each flotilla. However, an AEW version of shipboard 
nehcopler is not adopted widely. The reason is probably that most countries assume tileir 
o issions are always under cover of long-range shore-based aircraft, sllch as A WACS. It is 
a considerable issue, however, because it was the same reason that the Royal Navy rejected 
the Thorn-ENiJ' s propos.1.1 of an AEW adaptation of Search water before the Falklands War 
[Ref. 16: p. 143J Once this war happened, the Royal Navy ordertXi Sea King AEW and has 
operated it since then. Therefore, the limitation of A WACS operation has to be considered 
carefully by starting a study of suitable AEW platfonn alternatives for future maritime 
oper<l.tions. The result of a maritime operation of ScaKing is impressive: 
According 10 the Reet Air Arm helicopter AEW has brought new flexibility to 
naval operations. Searchwater's ability 10 'profile' targets and itS low-level 
detection gives a task force commander more information than he had before 
For e.xample Searchwaler's excellent definition enables it to delect a sea~ 
skimming missile at 45nm, a crucial advance in anti-missile defense. The 
reconnaissance role of the helicopter at sea is expanding rapidly, with ESM 
also providing passive detection of missiles al considerable range, hack up by 
actlvejammlDg. [Ref. 36: p. 74J 
On the other hand: 
Some critics doubt that shipboard helicopters will be allowed 10 fly around the 
battle £one. illuminating targets and relaying data back to parent ships, 
arguing Ihal the triple problems of Command. (,..outrol and Communication 
will ensure that all helicopters are 'confi ned to bangers as soon as ballic is 
imminent. [ReI. 36: p. 73] 
However, lhe artiele continues: 
Against that. il is beyond dispute that (;risis-management in a time of tension 
would be impossible without helicopters to reconnoiter and keep polential 
adversaries under surveillance_ [Ref. 36: p. 73] 
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Tablc6 shows the characteristics of a current version of Sea King AEW and USSR He!i,· 
B which may have same mission role. According to Jane's All The Worlds Aircraft, S, 
King AEW. Mk7 was proposed. It would be installed as a new radar (Searchwater 2000 
competitive GEC-Marconi Blue Vixen variant) and include ITIDS new data centra! system 
with color display The service entry I'.ould be in 2000. [Ref. 37] 
operational Speed (kt) 
Service Ceiling (feet) 
Endurance on Station(hr) 
Range(Nlvf) 
(Max . Standard Fuel) 
Surveillance radius(NM) 
Rotor Diameter (feet) 
Weight Empty (lb) 
Max. TIOWeight (lb) 
Sensors 








"Orange Crop' ESM 
'Jubilee Guardsman' IFF 
IFF tvIKll and Link16 











'Hot Brick' ESM 
'Slap Shpt' IFF 
Table 6. Ship-borne AEW Helicopter After Ref. (37) 
C. UAV 
In 1981, Edward Teller told the Association of Unmanned Vehiclc Systems that 
"The unmanned vehicle today is a technology akin to the importance. of radar and 
computers in 1935." [Ref. 38: p. 23] His words suggest thaI a UA V would be a 
indispensable technology for future military operation. Actually, the importance of having a 
UAV capability to support operational missions was stressed by the fonner President 
George Bush· 
"As a fonner Navy TBM (torpedo bomber) combat pilot. I appreciate the 
benefit~ to be gained by using unmanned lIehicles in high threat are.'l.S for 
reconnaissancc, and intclligencecollection prior to militar)· action .. 
"The limited use 10 data of unmanned vehicles in Vietnam. the Persian Gulf, 
and Lebanon has demonstrated their potential in accomplishing a wide range 
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missions. The work no'>\' underway on air, ground, and sea unmanned 
vehicles for our armed forces represents an opfXIrrunity to explore further 
their offensive and defensive capabilities. Unmanned vehicles have a 
significant plaCt~ in our future defense programs," [Ref. 38: p. 25] 
UA V technology could be provide a new way of battle field management to a 
commander. The most significant feature is that it can be used without exposing a human to 
danger. However, it is still in the developing stages and its operational concept is not 
clearly defined. There are lot~ of questions on how to use i:. For example, it would be used 
as an intelligence asset or as a combat a~set, in a tactical field or a strategic field. To put it 
the other way round, it has a great jXltelltiai on a variety of missions, Therefor , it should be 
a powerful al temativeof JMSDF AAWimpwvemcnts 
1. Maritime IJA V 
Whcn designing and/or acquiring a maritime UA V> one must wnsider thc limited 
deck space on surface combatants for launch and recovery. This indicates the need for a 
vertical -take-off-and-landing (VTOL) lype aircraft. Appendix E lists some of the types of 
UA Vs which are planned or currently being dcvdoped. In tenns of VTOL technology, the 
intcnneslung rotors are interesting. Two cOllnteaotating main rotor blades work together to 
increase aircraft lift by providing additional airOow for one another. Thus. an impressiVe 
lift-to-weight ratio can be achieved. Reportedly, Multi Mission lntenneshing Rotor Aircrdft 
(MMlRA) delUonstra,or developed by Kamman Corp. weighs under 4OJO lbs. but can 
carry a 6CO:J-lb payload. It is a manned aircraft for test purposes. However, Kamman Vice 
President Ken Nasshan said "We can ca~i ly scale dOlVn the demonstrator's size." 
Armed Force Jouflwi International in 1992. [Ref. 39J 
2, H ALE (High-Altitude, Long-Endurance) UA V 
Teledyne Ryan's Tier II -plus is a H.-\LE type UAV and one of the major UAV 
programs in the U.S. The operational chamcteristics are sholYn in Table 7. Since the 
operallon of land-base aircraft is restricted by its base, it cannot always help in a maritime 
operation . However, HA.LE UA V could overcome this. The reason is in the words of US 
Navy Capt. Al Hutchins in the Armed Force lournal: 
There wi ll he no ship launch caparn.hty for Tier 2-plus, which requires a 
scm·fOOl 31IShip, but considerable effort is being pUl into ensuring thallhe 
aJrcraft and lts payloads are controllable dIrectly from ShIPS. enher by 
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satellite or line-of sight radio link. "with a 3000 nm operating radius for Tier 
2-plus, there is no real need to have iton the deck." [Ref. 40: p. 39] 
rable 7. Cll)crational Characteristics of Tier II-plus 
Furthermore, HALE UA V has a lot of advantages over satellite and land-base 
l"_;1!;ne-..d aircraft like A WACS. These arc summarized in Table 8 From this table, it is 
obvious that HALE UAVs are also suited for the TB11D mission. Therefore, the H..A.L£ 
UA V should he a wOJthwhile altemativefor JMSDF AA W. 
Compared toSatcliites Compared to MalUled Aircraft 
x Relaxed rc1iabilityrequirement~ '" Can stay on-Slation far longer 
(comes back pericxiically for repair) '" Range allows basing option 
" Can use far less costly sensors " Air refueling not required 
" Can be ufXlatcd with new technology " "Wooden Round" in Peaatime 
" Can operate from any military airfield " Far lower unit cost 
" FaJ lower unit cost " Far lower operating 'cost 
" Continuous coverage in required area " More survival 
" Command and control organic to user 
Table 8. HALE UA V vs. Satellites and !"I-fanned Aircraft From [Ref. 41] 
D. AIRSHIP 
C.E. Myers, Jr's report about an airship. based on his ex~rience 1ll the six-
degrees·of-freedom Navy Air ship simulator at NASA's Ames Aeronautical Laooratory in 
California, describes an airship's attractive potential for maritime operation. His comments 
could provide a proper way of ICXlking at an ai rship: 
many. viewed th.e proP.osed Batth: Surveillance Airship as a. grotesque, 
sluggish, and ullmteTeS!)ng flYing machme. Othcl5, however. saw It as the 
world's fastest, most maneuverable ship, whieh is turning out to be the case 
to mines and torpedoes. it may be the 
There are two major airship based systems. One is the Maritime Aerostat Tracking 
and Surveillance system (MATSS), which is the latest and most versati le system offered 
for sea-based or land-based surveillance of littoral regions. The other is the Low Altitude 
Surveillance System (LASS) which is intended for long-r.mge detection of small low-flying 
aircraft. [Ref. 38J MATSS is insralled in the TCOM 32M airship and LASS is in TCO.\1 
7HI/\. These characteristics are listed in Table 9. 
Name TCO/v132M 
Length (feet) J 04,979 
Internal Volul!.e (eu ft) 6CXl35 
Max. payload (lb) 882 
Structural Weight(lb) 
OperatingAltitude (feet) 2950 (with 8821b payload) 
45S17 (with 44llb payload) 







(with 35271b payload) 
LASS 
(Fully coherent II) band radar (an all-solid state D band 
can detect 21.5 sq. ft arH coherent radar known as 
surface or air t.argets from E-LASS with a range 
2095-3940 ft. altimde) capability of 173 nm) 
Table 9. Characteristics of TCOM Airships After [Ref. 37] 
The rcsear<::h on an airship system in maritime operations was done by Shelby. 
[Ref. 431 In his study, a system is proposed to combine an air ship based fire control 
system with surface ship launched SAMs (NTUISM-2 ER), and scenarios are developed 
for convoy missions in a moderate ASCM threat environment and for surface battle group 
operdtions in a high threat (60, closely spaced ASCMs) environment. The results are 
extrdcLed from his abstract: 
1) USing an airship/AA W surface escort based AA W defensive system for 
con\'oys will have the requirement for AA W surface escort. 
2) In a surface battle group scenario, a combination of airship and older AAW 
escorts results in, a significant reduction in the total number of AA W escort'> 
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required to counter the ASCM threat, a reduction in the total number of escorts 
expected to receive damage during a raid, and the attrition of 90% of the 
attacking aiferaft. 
3) The cost of obtaining the indicated AA W capability over a 30 yeaf life-cycle is 
shown to be at least three times lower when using an airship based system 
compared to using a combination of fixed-wing and helicopters 
These surveys indicate that an airship is worth considering for further study ~s an 
alternative to improve the JMSDF AA W capability The greatest advantages of an airship 
could be a large payload and long endurancc. The small number of required <::re\\", 
compared to a ship, is also attractive. However, a survivability against anti -air missIles 
should he examined since an airship is dcarlyobservablc and seems to havc a large cn ucal 
E. DESIRABLE AEW 
Since AEW helicopters are alread" in service, intrOCucing these technologies to 
JMSDF would be the easiest way to upgr"de Aegis. If AEW platfonns arc an cmergent 
need, modifying the existing JMSDF SH-60J ASW helicopters or the MH-53E mine-
sv,·eeping helicopters into an AEW version seems to be reasonable. "Unlike unmanned aIT 
vehicles (UA V) they arc suitable for controlling and enforcing embargo measures 
(establishing contact, loweringirecovering of txmrding party, etc.)." (Ref. 44: p. 361 This 
operational flex ibility is one of the most desirable things in a low intensity contlict 
Therefore, adopting a shipboard AEW helicopter a~ an integral part of JMSDF Aegis 
should be considered. 
Using shipooard helicopters as Aegis assets is also consistent with the U.S. DDG-
51 Right IlA upgrade. However, its objective seems to be mainly a complement of a 
surface attack mission, and it is also based on the assumption that the aif contml or the air 
superiority is established. This assumption implies that a denial area has been alread~ 
secured by other methods, such as carrier based fighters. This is not the case that we are 
interested in 
Compared to fixed wing AEWssuch as E-2C Howkeyes, the helicopter's capabilit; 
is limited. It could be difficult to grasp the situational awareness of a wide area. The 
pr)!;;lcm is the limitation of payloads and an operational altitude. Actually the capability ot 
AEW is primarily dependent on installed equipment. It is directly related to the space and 
payloads of a platform. The ceiling is related to the physical constraints of search area, that 
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is a radar horizon. If a 100 l"l\1 radius of search a.rea is requued, the ceiling must be lIlore 
than 6600 fcct to meet the limit of radar horizon_ To make bad things worse, usually 
payloads and ceiling is a trade-off in a hdicopkr lype platform. This is an impxt<wl poi:1l 
when considering AEW alternatives 
Adding to thal, sending pilots into the potentially dangerous zone is wntroversial 
issue_ Giminatingthe r-isk of ca~ualties as mu<:.:h as posslble IS urgent 
This quote indicates no! only the casualties but al.so the required per~;'onIlel to operate a 
celtain system, such as operators, trainers, maintenance people_ Actually, saving hUmru) 
resources would be vital in Japan_ The Advisory Group on Defense Issue reported 
From the view pom! of saving human resources, an airship and LA V St:ell to be 
sUllable for JMSDF In the future, They also have a great potential in the tacucally chacging 
environments. Therefore, starting the research and developmcnt of an UA V and an airship 
is recommended 
F. SOFT KILL POINT DEFENSE \VEAPON (AEGIS AND FSU) 
Whal is verificd in thc trials of lvtome Carlo simulation is that to heavily rely on an 
area defense system to kill attacking ASCMs is not a gocx:l way. If we II} to achieve no risk 
of FSU kill by only using Aegis lethality, the cost should be vel} high. The reason is that 
the marginal ef[r.x;tivencss of achieving the high lethality around the cdgc of it~ weapon 
envelope would be moch smaller than pUlling point defensc systems on the units to be 
prote(;(ed. which is the FSU. 
Purely a defensive operation, including the provision of air cover over FSUs. needs 
a high confidence of IFF. Coccrtainty of the situation is increases as the distance [rom 
Aegls_ Therefore, it could Ix dif[icult [or AegIS commander to decidc launching missiles 
within tilt very restricted time, especially if the graduated response is re(.juircd 
Even if point defense systems are loaded on FSUs, weapons releasc is bound by 
strict, often inhibiting, rules of engagement. It could be said that the difficulty of releasing 
"hard kill" ,,"'capons in ambiguous situation is inherent and crim'ill 
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the hard kill solution is risky in hostile environments short of full-scale war 
Examples of thi~ include the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in J9R7~ to be 
effective. the area defense SAM system would have had to fire on an Iraqi 
aircraft before that aircraft fired .ilSanti-ship missile, i.e. before t~e potentially 
hostile but outwardly fnendly aircraft !tad confumed its lDtenllon to attack 
Anotber example is the USS Vincennes. which did fire in an apparently 
host!l~ Ira nian aircraft only to find that it wa~ as innocent civilian 
airijl'''r.[ReL 28: p. 59J 
Cllle solution (:> to adopt "soft kill" wea(Xlns as point defense system 
Some naval e;t:;perts conclude that the predominanlly 'hard kill' layered 
defense system must he augmented by a capable 'soi kill". particularly in tbe 
graduated response situations. (Ref. 28: p. 59) 
It may be more effectivcand could cost less' 
Reliance on hard kil l is seen in Europe as increasingly e;t:;pensive and fought 
with danger, while newer soft kill systems promising in prolonging the combat 
liveso[ vessels facing the threat of modern antiship missiles_lRef 47 P 38] 
the Austr-liian Nulka trials achieved over 90 percent kills Nulka cost 
per round is about 20 percent of the cost of SM-l.[Ref. 28: p. 60] 
Consideling the speed and sophistication of electronical equipments, the "soft kill" 
v.·capons (;ould be obsolete faster than "hard kill" wca(X}ns. The cffective life time we li d be 
shan. However, n:l1ecting the increasing importance of graduated response an_ cost 
reduction, "soft kill" weapons are recommended. In addition to that, installation of a FDint 
defense system on every FSU, including commeKial ships going through a dangerous 
zone, is also recommended 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND REMAINING PROBLEMS 
The principalmm of this thesis was to umkrstand and mooel the essential elements 
of air defense in future J!vlSDF AA W scenarios by using COEA basis of logic. The initial 
motive of this study coincides with c.E. Myers, Jf'S opinions about the Joim Advanced 
Strike Technology (l AST) 
lAST is typical ollhe backward apprrnlch, however. which assumes tbat the 
aviators can determine the mission afte r the aircraft is procured, Today. such 
efforts are much too expensive; tbe approach, whICh was "affordable" dUlIng 
the Cold War, is no longer appropriate. Today, new programs demand up-
~~~t~~:'~~~~~o:naa~ds~sval~~ll~~nt~eJ~t~~ee~h~C~;:t:::t:nSc~~~~gatRej9~lf~e731 
The key of any acquisi tion program is to identify the appropriate course of actJOIl in the 
early phases. It must answer these questions: 
What are the legitimate mission objectives') 
Why do we nf"-ed to pursue them? 
What are the alternatives? 
Can we adapt existing equipment if not, what is the charaeterof the equipment we 
need'i 
To answer these questions, a measure of effectiveness (MOE) for Aegis AA \1/ was defined 
for the mission threat analysis m a littoral area opemtion. It is "a denial area at an acceptable 
risk" . Several altemative improvements to Aegis were studied by using spread sheet 
models based on thIS MOE 
A. COl\"CLUSION 
As seen from the result" of Chapter IV , expanding the OTH capability, which 
includes the expansion of both sensors and weapons envelope, is a critical improvement for 
JMSDF Aegis destroyers. The sensor envelope expansion should have priority over 
evel)-thing since it is a prerequisite for the improvements of other weapon system 
eomponent~. In Chapter V, it was concluded thill AEW could be very effecti ve asset for 
expanding the OTH capability and as a "force multiplier". Adding to that, ulllizing the 
existing SH -60J heliwpteras AEW and starting further research of an UA V and an airship 
were recommended based on subjective examlIlation of JMSDF limited human resources. 
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From the results of the .\ionte Carlo simulation, a self-defense system loaded on a FSU is 
desired and a "soft kill" weapon would be suitable for graduated response situation which 
will be likely to occur in a littoral area. 
B. REMAINING PROBLEMS 
The spread sheet models developed here are useful for grasping the essential part of 
Aegis improvements, even though the models look so simple. However, they cannOI deal 
wi th n:'.Iltiple ASCM attacks. The saturJ.tion scenario and the point defense weapons 
coorJ .. ~IY)n would ,~' another challenge. When using the spread ·sheet, the IL<fdest 
quc~to': k , answer is how to estimate each PKSS. The assumption of a PKSS that is a 
consta·j through the layer is not true. It could be dependent upon a range. Furthermore, 
the inJqJCndence of each shot is also a questionable assumption in practice. These desirable 
modifications require future study. 
With regard to this study of Aegis AA W impmvement and based on the results of 
th is research, DoD/ns/ruction 5000.2 -M indicated: 
Too often, the eapubilities hoped for at the "pare: stage·' of . devejo~ment do 
not matenal u.e. A healthy degree of skeptlcLsm LS reqUIred In desenbmg the 
altematives. [Ref. 33,8-6J 
rhis implies [!.Lat next step should be an examination of the technological feasibility and COSt 
aspects of the specific Aegis improvements. The requirements must be feasible technically 
and also affordable. If a ship is used as a AEW platfonn, the limited deck space require 
VTOL aircraft as mentioned above. Adding to that, it should be noticed that an airb0'11e 
asset is a part of total AA \1,/ system. 
In addition to deck space constrains for landing and take-off. consideration 
must be given to top-side weight and moment. Many combatants are 
weight/moment critical. This would mandate that there be no new hardware 
installed above the waterline or additional antennae installations on masts 
Existing hardware, and command and control/antenna systcms must be 
utilized for the CAV and data distribution could be similar td that used 
presently with LAMPS MK Ill. [Ref. 38: p. 25J 
In terms of AEW, the effectiveness of the fusion of airborne and ship borne sensors should 
be validated· 
A Sea King equipped with Search water controls fighters directly (as dot:~ the 
m~ch more powerful E-2C) rather than merely h~ndling target data down to. a 
shlp ___ _ The sy~tem currently lacks the aLr-to-surface data link assOCIated With 
many earlier AEW aircraft (which did not them sclves control fighters): 
reportedly. Searchwater also suffers from clutter when tracking low-fiying air 
targets. Introduction of a coherent transmitter (as in the related Skymasler 
surface radar) would help solve the latter problem. as target doppler would be 
easier to extriLd. [Ref. 16: p_ 143 ] 
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funhcmlOrc, "The currentain.:rdft version of the CEC system, at 2,000 lbs. , could not fit 
within the Hawkeye's limited confines." [Ref. 48: p. 36] This implies Iha! the most 
importaut concern should be the payload of AEW aircraft. It could be derived from mission 
requirements and technological feasibility, which include future improvements. Thus, a 
dear operational concept of when and how it would bt used should be defined. What kind 
and level of operation we call expect for an airborne asset in the total weapon system is the 
key to the next step. In this context, AEW survivabi lity must be carefully studied since the 
impact on the total system after losing /\ EW could be huge 
As the result~ in Chapler V shown, the dramatic improvemcnr of At. W capability is 
also depended on developing a missile that reaches the OTH targets. Therefore, another 
remairung study is how to improve OTH SAM. There seems to be severa! alternatives. For 
example, using an airOOrne asset as a relay point of guidance commands, using another 
platform's illuminator for tenninal guidance, using active homing missile, and missi les 
canied by AEW etc. are possible. The key is also examini ng how much PKSS improvement 
and cost will be expected to develop each alternative. 
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APPENDIX A. ASCM CHARAcrERISTICS 
57 
58 
APPENDIX H. 2-D SAM FLIGHT PROFILE MODEL 
['he main purpose of developing a 2-D SAM night profile model is !() find an 
appropnate SAM average horizonlal speed to lise JS an input value in the l-D mood spread 
sheet S/l.1-2i\1k-41 VLSiAcgis system is a highly sophlsticatrd system with several phases 
of guidOUl;:;e, lIoweVtT for the average horizontal speed for I-D mooel, a simple: 
proportional navigation (PN) guidOUlce s;:;heme is used. Basically, the FORTRAN program 
of "T\\'o-dimensional tactical mi,')sile-target engagement simulation" in [Ref 51: p. 311 is 
rewritten in Vlwall:3asic in the macro of Microsoft :'::xcel 
\1athelllatieally, the proportional gUldance low ean be stated as 
IB-I) 
where nc is the a;:;celerJ.tion command (in flis'), :'..J is a unitless desigr.er chosen gain 
(lisuady III the range of 3-5) known as the elledivenavigalionralio, I,'c is the mi.~sllc-target 
closing ~-elocily (in fUsl, and i. is the Iim:-of·sight angle (in radio Tht: overdot indicates the 
time derivalive of the line-of-~ight angle or the lint:-of.·sighl rale, This,Program uscs the 
assumption that both the SAM ami larget travel at a consumt velocity. [Ref. 51: p. 26] 
-:-.'he hoost pha,e of the Aegis missile is too complex to simulate in a simple 
program. Therefore, instead of simulating this phase, the highest position of tht: SAM in 
the flighlat which (ht: SAM lUay be flying horizontally. and time from iaun;:;h to this poim 
are assumed and ust:d as input variables to this PN simulatior; 
Hgurcs 24, 25, and 26 show the SAM profile against :"1a<.:h 0.9, 2.0, and 3.5 
ASC\1 with {ill [eclaltitc:de. SAlv1 velocity is assumed Mach 2.5 and the PI\" starting point 
is a SCXXl foot altitude and 1 NM horiwntally away from Aegis. The necessary time from 
launch to the lipper point is 5.5 seconds. and the ASC\1 detection occur:,; at the rddM 
horiwn of 16.':' N}"l. The rca<.:tion time from initial dcle<.:tion to SA:'vf launch is 10 se<.:onds. 
The average horizontnl speed of each case IS sUffiffiariu-",l Table 10 
ASC Speed (. aeh) 2.0 3.5 
A Average i-lonwntal Speed (lvlach) 2.01 
Tahle 10. SAM Average I Iorizontal Speed (PN Simulalion) 
.')9 
Range (NM) 
Fig. 24. SAM RIght Prohle agaInst Mach 0.9 ASCM 




Fig. 25. SAM Flight Profi le against Mach 2.0 ASCM 
7 
Range (J\'?-.-t) 
Fig. 26. SAM Flight Profile against Mach 3.5 ASCM 
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**~**~dU~"~""U PN SIMULATION PROGRAM "u***u* * """"* ""'****** **~ 
Do While VC > 0 
If RTM:> 5000 Then 
dt ::. ] 
ElseIf RTM > 3<XX) Then 
dt= 0.1 
Elself RTM > lOX) Then 
dt = 0.01 
Else 





ORtz = Rtz 
ORmx=RlOx 




For o = I To2 
Rrm >" =RtA Rmx 
RIm ~ : Rtz · Rnn 
RP,.' ~ 3q[(Rlm~ '", f Rtmz "2.) 
LO;S :: ,,-tn(Rtrnz! I:"<.tlll-': 
\ 't' !;:\ '" Vtx- Vm;\,. 
I, U:l<. '"' V~!. - Vm" 
ve'" ·(lit)""x '" V !,~ \ + ~r;I1z:O Vtm::>. ) I RTM 
U )S'O'-,':Rtmx ~ ·V!;.',;: . «.cmz ~ Vtmx) / (fUM "2) 
Nt:: "'; I'·U • ve" L'~SI ) 
a i ) ,\: . N<" ~ SiI1( U X;' 
ann. = "Ie" Cu3(LOS\ 
Rmx '" .T?mx + dt ·' '1m", 
P-..-nz = Rmz + d r " Vm! 
H. t:>.. = Rl'( + dt * \',:\ 
Rtz= Rtl+dt* Vtz 
VlOx = '1mx + dt " Jmx 
Vmz =- Vrnz + dt ~;:unz 
Vtx == -Vt '" Cos(beta) 
Vtz = Vt * Sin(beta) 
betad== NT! Vt 
beta = beta + bctad • lit 
Next 
T ==T + dt 
Rtx = 0.5 * (ORtx + Rtx) 
Rtz == 0.5 '" (ORtz + Rtz) 
Rrnx -= 0.5:0 (ORmx + Rmx) 
Rmz == 0.5 '* (ORmz + Rmz) 
Vmx == 0.5 '" (OVmx + Vmx) 
Vmz=O.5 * (OYmz + VmL) 
beta == 0.5 * (Obeta + bela) 
Worksheets( 1).Cells(i , "H") == T 
Worksheets(I) .Cclls(i, "[") = Rmx ! 6076. 115 
Workshcets(l).Cclls(i, "J") = RmL 
Workshcets(l).Cells(i, "K") == Rtx 
Worksheets(l).Cells(i, "L *) = RTM 
Workshccts(l).Cells(i. "M") == NC / 32.185 
i == i + I 
lDop 




APPENDIX C. EXPECTED VALUE SPR EADSHEET AND 
MACRO PROGRAM 
Ii""'.' I ~ ~ - I 
! ~ lIi , 
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UUU,",,,,*************** EXPECTED VALUE PROGRAM ***"'****"'*****"'*"' '''''' 
SubAAWO 





range(" F4: F5.F..8: E 12,I6: L20").Sclect 
-::election.ClearContents 
' ~. ' '* ******"'***************** *****~*** ~ *****:n:**** **** ** ** * * '" 
For i =- 18 To22 
Worksheets(I).Cells(i + 14, "A") = i -17 
ForJ =- 3 To6 




Application.CutCopyMode =- False 
Selection. Sort Keyl:=range("C3J"), Orderl:=xlDescending. Header:=_ 
xlGuess, OrderCuslom:=-I, MatchCase:=-False, Orientation:=-_ 
,,,*~,,~J'?f::~;;c;,~~~* *** ****** ****** * ***.***.**.*** ******,"*****~ 
Dim WO As Variant 
ReDim W(6, 8) 
Fori= 1 To6 
For j= I To8 






[)::, Whilc W(i, 3) <> 0 
N=N+l 
i= i+ 1 
Loop 
Vcm=- Workshects(l)_Cells(13, "S"l.Value 
DP= Worksheets(I).Cells(l4, ·W).Value 
Rdet = Worksheets(1).Cel!s(24, "B"l.Value 
dtl = Workshccts(1).Cclls(2S,"S").Value 
dll =- Worksheets(I).Cells(26, "B").Value 
dti =- Worksheets(J).Cells(2S, "F").Value 
'*********** compleate reading *.".*.~ •• ***.****** 
Rid = Rdet - (dll + dti) * VCIn 
Workshects(1).Cc1ls(14, "G")::: Rid 
Fori=- J ToN + I 
If Rid >= W(i. 6) Then 
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Rid :: W( i, G) 
Rfire= Rid - W(i, 5) '" Vern 
Exit For 
ElseTfRid >== Wei, 7 ) + Wei, 5) "' Vern Then 




IfDP>= Rfi reThen 









ffRin t<= DPThen 
GoTodeath 
End If 
Do While W(i+ I , 1)<4 
If Rid >;;; Wei + 1, 6) Then 
Rid = Wei + 1, 6) 
Rfirc= Rid - Wei + 1, 5)" 
EIseJfRJd- W(i+ I, 5)" Vern> I, 7) Then 
Rfire= Rid - W ei ~ 1,5)" Vt-ID 
Else 
i = [ - I 
GoTo xx 
End If 
i = i -I 
dt3 ", Wei,S) 
Rmin= wei. 7) 
Vsarn:=W(i,2) 





i= i + 1 
If Wei, L) = 4 Then 
Vsam=W(i,2) 
Pssk = Wei, 4) 
GoToGun 
Else 




,~"*",**,,,******," Stan Subroutine Fire ****************** 
Fire 
shot = 0 
Do While Rfire >= Rmin 
Tint= Rfire I (Vcm+ Vsam) 
Rint= Vsam '" Tint 




Worksheets( 1).Cells(wp + shot + 6, "I") = Rfire 
Workshccts(I),Cells(wp + shot + 6, "J") = Tint 
Worksheets(I).Cells(wp + shot + 6, "K") = Rim 
Worksheets(l) .Cells(wp + shot + 6, "L") = Pssk 
shot = shot + 1 
Rid == Rint - dt2" Vcm 
Rfire = Rid . dt3 ~ Vcm 
1)+7, "E") = shot 
Tim= Rfirel (Vcm+ Vsam) 
Ruu = Vsam * Tint 
If Rmt<= DPThcn 
i= i + I 
Pssk = Wei. 4) 
GoTo Point 
End If 
Worksheets(l),Cells(wp + 6, "I") = Rfire 
Workshcets(l) .Cclls(wp + 6, "J") = Tint 
Worksheets(l).CelJs(wp + 6, "K") =- Rint 
Worksheets( l),Cells(wp + 6, "L") = Pssk 
Worksheet,,(l).Cells(W(i, 1) + 7, "E") == 1 
i = i+ 1 








APPENDIX D. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION SPREAD 
SHEET AND MACRO PROGRAM 
7 \ 
'~ ~ ~ * **** * ** *lvlo nte Carlo Simulation Program ************"'>'<'"****** 
Sub AAWsimO 
Sheets("Slleetl"),Sclect 'Clear previous ron rcsu lts 
Range(" 87: 1314,C7: C 13 ,!-I8: L22J26:130.F2: F4,l33 G: F40,F6: F 13")_ Select 
Sclection_ClearContents 




Copy inpulcd weapon chracteristics to bottom tahles 
For K = 28 To 32 
\Vorkshcets(I)Cells(K + 8, "W ) = K· 27 
Forl=2To5 
Worksbeets(I)_Cclls(K + K I + I) == Worksheets(l)_Cells(K, I)_Value 
Ne:ol.t I 
:-.Je!l.tK 
'Sort by using "weajX)n rna:ol. range" descendingly to eliminate not carrying weponary 
'I f range==O, which means no weajX)n, put down to the bottom row 
Range('B35:F40"),Sort Keyl:=Rangc("C35") , Orderl:=:oI.IDcscending. Header:=_ 
:oI.IGucss O rderCustom =1 MalchCase =False OnentatlOn '" 
:oI.ITopTo13oltom 
attack = Worksheets(I)_Cclls(2, "8")_VaJuc 'EJlpected number of attacks during the 
mlSSlon 
FSli == \Vorksheets(l),Cells(3, "B"),Value 'The likeli h<XXl of attacking HVli (not AegIS) 
tria l == \Vorksheets(I) ,Cells(4, '13").Value Number oftrial(=run) 
counter = 0 
countattack = 0 
SC '" 0 'mission success counter 
FC '" 0 'mission fail countcr 
Do While counter < trial 
'Clcarprevious lrial results 
RangeC"B7:C13,12G:130,F8: FI l ")Select 
Selcc tion.ClearContents 
Workshccts(l),Cells(6, "F") = counter + I 'Show current trial number 
"'h~~~~"~A"AA"AAh"~"' '''''''''' program for tach attack "'~A"''''h'''''~'''h''''''''''~h'''~hAAAI-.''' 
Do \Vhile countattack < attack 
(:lrear prevIOus attack re~ults 
Range("B7: B 13, H8: L22"). Select 
Selection ClearContcnts 
Workshf.Cts(l) .Cells(7, "F") '" countattack + I 'Show cunent atta(;k nuinber 
~~~~~~kcs~:~(~e~~I!~ro,' "PI == "MulfunctionISunk" Then 
Ap=2 
Else 
Ap == Rnd 'R.nd :random number (0-1) 
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End If 
'AI' represents hostile inltnliun. If Aegis is sunk > all th reat will artack FSL 
'If Aegis work, threat is spli t based on the artack ratio 
If Ap <= FSU Then 
Workshccts(1)Cells(8, "F") == "FSU" 
Application_Run Macro:","AegisFSU!cover" 'main program artack against FSl; 
Elself Ap <= I Then 
Worksheets(l ).Cells(8, "F") -; "Aegis" 
Application_Run Macro:=" AegisFSUlshoot" 'main program artack again81 Aegis 
Else 
Workshtel~(l) Cell s(8, "P) "" "FS!}" 
Applica tion_Rlln "'lacro:=="AegisFSUiseli" 'main program after Aegis sunk 
End If 
Appl ication.Run Macro:"," AegisFSU Ishotdown" 
ApplicatlOn.Run '\'Iaclo: "," AegisFS U I poi otj nd' 
countartack '" countattack + 1 
Loop 
'Output the number of mission success and fail to caliculate the probabi li ty of mission success 
oountattack '" 0 
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'******~*U"'** START MAIN PROGRAM (attack against Aegis) *",",*** 
Sub shootO 
'Read Weapon Cbaractt:rs from the spreadsheet and put them into matrix W(i,j) 
Dim WO As Variant 
ReDim W(6, 10) 'For program tech. W(6,j) arc always "0" 
Fori = I T06 
Forj ",IT08 




Wei. 9) = Worksheets(l).Cells(W(i, 1) + 6, 3).Value 'Read conswned weapon quantity 
Wei, 10) = Worksbeets(l)Cells(W(i, I) + 6, 4).Value 'Read initially carried weapon 
quantity(=1imit) 
Next i 
'Make SL c how many iayers(weapons) we bave 
'(When max range=O, no more layer exist) e .g.N=4 we have four defeuce layer 
N==O 
i == I 
Do While Wei, 2) <> 0 
N=N+I 
'cf W(6,2) is always 0 
i = i + 1 
I~p 
'Read Threat Characte rs 
Vcrn = Workshet:ts(i)Cells(18, "F"). Value 'ASCM incomming speed. 
DP ", Worksheets(l).Cells(l9, "r"}Value 'If ASCM penetrates within DP, Aegis would 
'he damaged 
'Read Sensor & Combat system capabil ity 
Rdet '" Worksbeets(1).Cells(22, "8"). Value 
dt l = Workshects(I).Cells(23. "8 ").Value 
enVIronment 
rlt2 == Workshcets(1).Cells(24, "B").Value 
dti '" Worksbeets(l) .Cells(20, "B").Vaiue 
'Initial detection point 
'Delay time from detection to identification 
'depend on sensor, combat system and 
'Kill assesmentde1aytimt: 
, Initia l reaction delay time (readiness) 
'--~----------------- Compleate Reading --------~----~-------
'Calculate Identification Point 
Rirl '" Rdel - (dt! + rlti) "' Vcrn 
'Find Starting weapon 
Fori ", I ToN 
fI Rid > Wei , 6) Then 
, "i" indicates layer (i=1 is the most outerlayer available) 
Rid = W(i , 6) . 'If Aegis track tbreat far enough to use max weapon. range, wait amI fire 
Rfire", Rid - W(l, 5)"' Vcrn 
Exit For 
Elscif Rid > Wei, 7) + W(i, 5) '" Vcm Then 
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RIire co Rid · W(i , 5) * VCIJl within tbe weapon Te<lChabIc range, 
Exit For 
End If 
Next i 'FlDnaly "i" indicatt:s the starting layer countt:d from the most outer layer 
If DP >; Rfire Then 'The case of Aegis cao't find an ASCM unti l it hit 
End If 
NM = 1116.451 flJ76 .11 5 'con~tant transform "Mach->nmisec' 
max. range 
'Choose weapon subroulloe depend on Layer ID 
' _______________ Returning !inc from subrout ine "SAM" ------~ __________ _ 
'If SAM missed and ASCI\-f is within DP, Aegis mu'St be damaged 
' Then go to death (also this trial sbould be tenninated) 
H represents the event state~ - "bit" or "roiss ' 
'If hit , trial should be treminated. Skip to "hit"(=end). 
on nexllayer(i+ \) weapon (i.e ,SAl'-l Gun. or CIWS) 
'SAM case 
1,7)Then 
'Input variables for suhroutine"SAM"-Rrnin.Vsam. Pssk. 
'and number of consumed and initially carried weapon 
---------------- returning lint: horo subroutine "SAM" - --- __ _ 
If Riot <= DP Then 
GoTo death 
7S 
If Rid >c: Wei + I, 6) Then 
Rid ==W(i+ 1,6) 
Rfire= Rid - Wei + 1,5) * Vcm 
Else!fRid -Wei + 1,5)* Vcm>W(i + I, 7) Then 
Rfire == Rid - Wei + 1,5) * Vcm 
End If 
i '" i + 1 
lfW(i, l) ==4 Then 
Vsam:= Wei, 3) '" NM 
Pkss:= Wei, 4) 
Consum == Wei, 9) 




Consum '" \\I(i, 9) 






, ~*"* ****,. ***** *,,, ** Start ,subroutine "SAlvi" *",**",,.*,,*,,,******,,** 
SAM 
shot == 0 
'Continue to fire until the firing point (intercept +time delay) is less than 
, required range where it can intercept within minimum range(=next weapon max range) 
Do Wbile Rfire > Rmin 
If \V(i, 9) >= Wei, 10) Tben 'CK remaining weapon ql1antity 
Rint =0 Rid 
Exit Do 'If nothing remains then use next layer wea!XJn 
End If 
Tint", Rfire I (Vcm + Vsam) 
Rint = V sam * Tint 
If Rint <= DP Then 'If intercept JXlint is within DP, then Aegis must gt:t damage 
Exit Do 'Exit Do loop and subroutine and then go to "death" 
End If 
\Vorkshect~(l)_Cells(wp + shot + 8, "H"):= Rfire 'ASCM point from Aegis@SAMfire 
\\lorksheets(I),Cells(wp + shot + 8, "I") '" Tint 'Required time from launch to intercept 
Worksheets(I),Cells(wp + shot + 8, "J"):= Rint 'Intercept point from Aegis 
Worksheets(I),Cells(wp + shot + 8, "L") = Wei, I) 'wea!XJn layer ID 
shot = shot + I 
Wei, 9):= \\10,9) + I 
Rid = Rint - dt2 ,. Vcm 
Rfire=Rid-dt3"'Vcm 
'Counting shots 
'KilJ assesment time delay ("look" time) 
'Next firing !XJint 
'AAAAAAAA~AAAAhA simulate intercept (shot down or miss) AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAhh 
If Rnd <= Pkss Then ,;~~~~~d~~e~p~~,r je~~~l~it~r"~~ or "mIss· 
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Workshccts(1).Cells(wp + shot + 7, "K") == "hi t" 
H == Worksheets(ll.Cclls(wp + shot + 7, "K") 
Exit 00 'If hit, trial should be lcrrnillil tcd 
Else 'Theil cJ!;i t Do loop, su broutine, and skip to "bit 
Worksbeets(J),Cells(wp + shot + 7, "K") =c "miss' 'If miss, continue to shoot 
End If 
"\"~ AA h~~h~A~AAAAA ~~A ~~ ~~~"AAA,,,,,,"AAA~~~AAAA~"AA""AAAAA~A"~""""~ 
1) T 6, "B") == shot 'number of shots done within the layer 
If W(i, 9) >= Wei. 10) Then 
i= i+ I 





Tin t == Rfi rt: i (Vern ... Vsam) 
Rin! ""- Vsam " Tint 
If Rint <= Dr Then 
i == i+ I 
Ph s= W(i.4) 
OoTo Cl\VS 
End If 
' M\~~~A"AA""""""""h simulate inte rcept (gun)""h""M\~~M\""""A 
Prnd= Rnd 
If Prod <= Pbs Then 
WorkshceL~(l)_Cells(wp + 8, "K") = "hit" 
GoTo hit 
Else 
Worksheets(l).Cells(wp + 8, "K") '" "miss" 'If miss, use CIWS layer weapon 
End If 
10) Then ·C'K remaining quantity 




Worksheets(I)_Cells(wp + 8, "J") '" Wei, 2) 
Worksheets(I).Cclls(wp + 8, "L") '" Wei, I) 
Worksheets(l).Cells(\v(i, t) + 6, "8") = I 
Prnd '" Rnd 
If Prod <= Pkss Theo 
WorksheetS(l}_Cells(wp + 8, "K") = "hit" 
OoTo hit 
End If 
\Vorkshcets(l) .CeUs(wp + 8, "K") = "Aegis damaged" 
GoTodeath 
'ct " ~ "' ''o$ * * * o$" * * '" '" * * *" "' .. *"''' '" '" * '" "''' *'" * '" '" * * *,. * "' ''' "',. * ~ "'~,. ~'" '" ~ '" "',. ",,,~ ,, ~ 
de~t.':. 
Wor).:~hcets(l) . Cells(12> "B") = 1 'To couot how maoy times Aegis got to be u:.magcd 
hit 
, cumulate oumber of shots from the begining(=weapon consumption) 
Form=7To 13 
Workshccts(I)_Cclls(m, "C") = \Vork.~hcet.\( I) _Cclls(m, "C") + Workshects(l) .Cells(m, 'B") 
Next 
'Check status 
If Worksheets(I).Cells(12, "C").Value = 0 Then 
Workshects(l)_Cclls(lO, "F") = "No Damage" 
ElselfWorkshects(1)Cells(12, "C)_Value < \Vorkshcets(I)Cclls(12, "J)") ,Value Then 
\Vorksbeets(l),Cells(lO, "F") =: "Parcial Darnge" 
Else 
Worksheets( I)Cclls( 1 0, "F') '" "MulfuoctiooiSuok" 
E:-;it Suh 
EodIf 
'U************* MAIN PROGRAM (attack against FSU) ~ ,.*********~u ,. 
Slib coverO 
Dim \'10 As Variant 
ReDim W(6, 10) 
l-ori=IT06 
For.l=IT08 




\V(i, 9) =: Worksheets(l).Cells(W(i, I) + 6, 3).Value 




D"J While \V(i, 2,) <> 0 
N ,,,N + I 
i =: i + I 
Loop 
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'Read Threat Characters 
Vern '" Worksbccts(l)_Cells(l8, "F")Value 
DP == Workshccts(I)Cells(l9, "F'l·Value 
'Read Sensor & Combat system capability 
Rdct =: \\/orksht:t:!s(1),Cells(22, "W ) Value 
dtl =: \Vorksheet>( I),Cells(23, 'B")VaJuc 
d12 =: Workshcct~(I)Cells(24, "B"l·Valuc 
dli == Worksheets(l),Celis(20. "B").Value 
'Read FStJ position and self-defense capabil ity 
Position'" \Vorksbeets(l),Cells(22. "F'), Value 
Pkfsu "" Workshcets(ll.Cells(23, "F").Value 
' ________________ CAlffipleate Reading ----------~-----~ 
)~jd '" Rdet · (dt! + dIll * Vern 
For I =: J To N 
If Rid > W(i, 6) Then 
Rid ", Wei. G) 
Rfire '" Rid - W(i, 5) '" Vern 
b it For 
Elself Rid> Wei, 7) + WO, 5) '" Vern Then 




If DP + Position >= Rfire Then 
GoTo deatb 
End If 
NM = 111 6.45 i W76. 115 
The 1st shoOliog weapon characters 
dt3;oW(i,5) 
Rmin == W ei, 7) 
Vsam == Wei, 3) * NM 
P,sk==W(i,4) 
Consum = Wei, 9) 
Limit = W(i, IO) 
wp = 0 






'------------Returning line from subroutine 'FSUSAM"---------~-----
If Rint <= Dr + Position Then 
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GoTo death 
ElseH H ;0 "hit" Then 
GoTo hit 
End If 
'Only SAM provide air cover over FSlJ 
DoWhileW(i+ I, 1)<:4 
If Rid >"= Wei + 1,6) Then 
Rid==W(i+ 1,6) 
Rfire == Rid - Wei + 1,5) * Vcm 
Eiself Rid - Wei + 1,5) * Vcm > Wei + I, 7) Then 
Rfire = Rid · Wei + I, 5)" Vcm 
Else 
i == i + I 
GoTo xx 
End [f 
i= i+ I 
dt3 = wei, 5) 
Rmin == Wei, 7) 
Vsam '" WO, 3) * NM 
Pkss == Wei, 4) 
GoSub rSUSAM 
----------------- returning line from subroutine 'FSUSAM" --------- -----
If Rint <= DP + Position Then 
GoTo death 
EIscJf H = "hit" Then 
OoTo hit 'Status C'K 
End If 
'*"**"***""**""'**~" ''''Start Subroutine FSUSAM*~~~" * "~*~"'* *" *~ * 
r SUSAM 
shot", 0 
Do \Vhiic Rfire > Rmin 
If Wei, 9) >= WO, 10) Then 'CK remaining weapon quantity 
Rint '" Rid 
Exit Do 
Endlf 
Tint'" Rlire I (Vcm + Vsam) 
Rint == V sam" Tint 
If Rint <= DP + Position Then 'If intercept point is within DP+Position, then FSU must 
get damage 
E;"i t Do 'Exit Do loop and exit subrouti ne and then go to death 
End If 
Worksheets(l) .Cells(wp + shO! + 8, "I-I") 0= Rfire 
Worksheets(1).Cells(wp + shot + 8, 'I") == Tint 
\Vorkshects(l).CeIls(wp + shot + 8, "J") == Rint 
\Vorksheets(1 ).Cells(wp + shot + 8, "L") '" Wei, 1) 
shot == shot + I 
wei, 9) == \V(i, 9) + 1 
Rid", Rint - dt2 .. Vern 
80 
Rfire = Rid - dt3 '" Vcm 
'A~A~A~~~~~~~~~A simulate Intercept (sbO( down or miss) ~~~~~~~~~~~AAAAAA 
Prnd '" Rnd 'Prnd:randum number 0-- 1 
If Prnd <= Pssk Tben 'Compear given Pssk, determin "bit" or "miss" 
Worksbuts(i).Cclls(wp + shot + 7, "K") '" "hit" 
H '" Worksbeets( I).Cells(wp + shot + 7. "K") 
Exit Do 'If hit. trial should be tcrminated. 
Else Tben exit Do loop, subroutine. and skip to "hit" 
Worksbccts(l).Cells(wp + shot + 7, "K") == "miss" 'If miss. continue to sboot 
End I~AA~~~~~~~~~~"""AAAA~~~~~~AA~"AAA~~~"~~"~~~~~"""~"""AA"""AA"A"A" 
Loop 
Worksbeets(I).Cells(W{i, I) + 6, "8") = sbot 
wp = wp + sbot 
Return 
''" '" ~ '" '" '" '" '" '" '"'" '" '" '" '"" ~'"'" '" '" '" ~'" '"'" '" •• ,". "'* - "'- '" '" '" '" -- *- * *- '"* "'. '". "'. * '" " 
deat b' 
P", Rnd 
If P <= PHsu Then 
Worksbeets{I).Cells(wp + 8, "K ") = "FSU Suvival" 
EI~ 
Worksheets(I) .Cells(wp+ 8, "K") = "FSU damaged" 




Worksbeets(l).Cells(m, "C") = Workshcets(I),Cells(m, "CO) + Workshee\s(I).Cells(m, "8" ) 
Next 
If Worksbeets(I).Cells(13. "C")Value= o Tben 
Worksbuts(1).Cells(ll. "P) = "No Damage" 
Eiself Worksbeels(1),Cel1s(13, "C"),Value < Worksbuts(I).Cells(13, 'D").Value Tben 
Worksheets(I).Cells(ll. ~F") = "Parcial Damage" 
EI~ 
Worksbuls(l).Cells(l1, "P) = "Mulfunction/Sunk" 
Exit Sub 
End If 
~n.d*~u*b,"*** ,",","*~* ••• **,",".*****.*******,"*,"**,"****,"****,"****,"'" 
'**'"**"'***"'"'" MAIN PROQRAM(afler Aegis sunk) **'"":"*"""'"*"u*uu" . 
Sub self 0 
Pkfsu = Worksbuts(l).Cells(23, "F"). Value 
P= Rnd 
If p <= Pkbvu Tben 
Worksbeets(l).Cclls(S. "K") =- "FSU Suvival" 
Else 
Worksbeets(I).Cells(8, "K") = "FSU damaged" 
Worksbuts(l) .Cells(13. "8") =- I 
End If 
For m = 7 To 13 
Worksbuts(I) .Cells(m. "C") '" Worksbccls(I),Cells(m. "C")+ Worksheets(I).Cel ls(m, "8") 
Next 
If Worksbeets(l).Cells(l3. "C").Value '" 0 Tben 
Worksbeets(J).Cclls(ll. "p) = "No Damage" 
Elself Worksbeels(I) ,Cells(13, "C").Value < Worksbeets(I).Cells(13. "0"). Value Then 
Worksbuts(1).Cells(ll, "F") = ·Parcial Damage" 
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£I" 
Worksheets(l)_Ccl1s(ll, "F") '" "MulfunctionISunk" 
End If 
End Sub 
·~~t * ,.t******* * ***** END MAIN PROGRAM ***** *** .. ******** * ~** 
' '''******** *Looking for "hit' in tbe output to fiud shot down range **"'*~ *U*** 
Sub shotdownO 
PK '" Worksbeets(l),Cells(8, "K") 
For Count ", 0 To 15 
PK", Worksheets(I),Cells(8 + Count. "K") 




If PK '" "hit" Then 
\Vorksheels(J)CeJls(l4, "8") = Worksheets(l)_Cells(8 + Count, "1") Value 
Ese 
\\'ork~hccts(1).Cells(14> "8") '" 0 
Eurl; ;-
F:lld Sa b 
'***** ~ * ..... **** lvlaking histogram of shot down point *****"* * *** *~~~ "'***~~'" 
Sub po 'ltind(l 
\Vorksh"et~(2J-Cells(1. "A"J = Workshcets(l)_Cells(l4, "W}Value 
Foro = I To 101 
\ .... urksheels(2l·Cells(o, "1"') '" Worksheets(2).Cells(o, "F") + Worksheets(2).Cells(o, "E").VaJue 
Ne,,! 
End Sub 
'P'*** ** ********** **** END PROGRA:V1 * ** ******* *** ** **"* ~ ~",*",,, ~ 
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APPENDIX E. VTQL UAV 
Name canadair Daimler-Benz Deadalus Research 
CL·227 Sentinel Arerospace Seamons STF-9AIB 
Country C.S.A Germa'l C .S.A 
Speed (In) 70 9() m <>x 100 max 
CeiJing(fcet) 10000 NIA 20000 
Endurance (hour) 4,5 6 
Weight(lb) 510 1474 742 
Propulsion tu rboshaIt turboshaft rotary pIs ton engIne 
Guidance INS, remote control INS, pre -programed iNS/OPS. 
pre-programed or 
remoteCO\1lrol 
Payloads realtime TV {FUR Doppler radar realtimcTVIrLIR 
N",," Sikorsky Technology Freewing Aerial 
Cypher Management RPG ~oboticsTilt-body 
COlln!ry U.S.A Sweden Fnmre 
Speed (kt) 75 cruise 65 ISO max 
Ceiling (fcct) 8200 NIA 10000 
Endurance (hour) 3 2.5 
Weight (lbs) 362 94 461 
Propulsion rotary piston cngme piston engme piston engine 
Guidance 
INSIGPS , GPS, INS/UPS, 
pre-programed or pre-programed or pre-programed or 
remote control remote control remote control 
Payloads 
realtime realti meTVIFLlR real time 
TV/FLJRJEWI TVfFLIRIEW 
Table 11. VTOLUAV From [Ref. 52] 
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